Supreme Court issues notice to Centre seeking Constitutionality of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020

The Supreme Court in the case titled Association of Karvy Investors v. Union of India has issued a notice to the central government on 16th June 2020 regarding the constitutionality of the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020. A plea was filed seeking the constitutional validity of Sections 3 and 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020. The notice was issued to the central government by a three-judge bench comprising of Justice Rohinton Nariman, Justice Navin Sinha and Justice B R Gavai. The Court has also extended protection to all the pertinent petitions filed under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020 that does not meet the 10% requirement as directed by the amendment. 

The individual members of the petitioner institution, Association of Karvy Investors had filed the plea under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code Act before the different benches of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in India because of the non-payment of their dues by the private companies. The petition seeks to challenge the said Amendment Act by asserting that Section 3 "has imposed a strict and onerous condition on the right of an individual financial creditor in order to file the application for initiating corporate insolvency resolution process under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code". The applicable condition is that NCLT will allow an application under Section 7 only when 100 members of such class of individual investors or a group of them that represent 10% of the class who has jointly filed an application. The present plea was filed by Advocates Srijan Sinha, Aishwarya Sinha, and Himanshu Chaubey and they emphasized that section 3 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020 violates the right to equality and hence, shall be struck down. It emphasizes that the application under section 3 of the said amendment act has been considered as a retrospective and this leads to the prejudices amongst the members of the petitioner association. 

In the order passed by the bench, it has provided for the status quo that shall be maintained in the pending applications as the earlier provisions stand amended by the new IBC Ordinance. 

#saketagarwal #IBC #insolvency #NCLT

No action against firms for non-payment: Supreme Court

Supreme Court on Friday asked the government not to resort to any coercive action against private companies who have not paid their workers full wages during the lockdown in accordance with a government order in March.

The order came on petitions, including one filed by an association of companies from Punjab, challenging the validity of the MHA notification mandating payment of full wages to workers during the lockdown.

“How long can the government expect companies to pay?” a three-judge bench headed by Justices L Nageswara Rao asked Solicitor General Tushar Mehta who sought further time to respond to the petition. While hearing another petition filed by Ficus Pax Ltd, the apex court had last month given two weeks to the Centre to place on record its policy on the MHA notification directing payment of full salaries/wages to employees/workers during the lockdown.

Ludhiana Hand Tools Association has also challenged the validity of Section 10(2)(i) of the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

Terming the MHA order as arbitrary, it said the order violated the private firms’ right to carry on any occupation, trade or business guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Business affected

The bench said there may be small industries, which are affected due to the lockdown as they can sustain for say 15 odd days but not more and if they cannot earn, how are they going to pay their workers

SC extends limitation for Arbitration Act, Negotiable Instruments Act cases

The Supreme Court on Wednesday extended the period of limitation for cheque bounce cases and arbitration proceedings amid the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown.

A Bench led by Chief Justice S.A. Bobde issued notice to the government through the Attorney-General to find if there were other laws which require extension of limitation period.

On March 23, the court had used its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to lift the limitation period for all cases across tribunals and courts until further notice to obviate difficulties and ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file proceedings.

The “period of limitation” is the maximum time set by a statute beyond which the alleged violator faces legal action.

“In view of this court’s earlier order on March 23 and taking into consideration the effect of the COVID-19 and resultant difficulties being faced by the lawyers and litigants and with a view to obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunal across the country including this Court, it is hereby ordered that all periods of limitation prescribed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 shall be extended with effect from March 15 , 2020 till further orders,” the Supreme Court order read.

In case the limitation has expired after March 15, then it would be extended for 15 days post the lifting of the lockdown.

COVID-19: New dress code for advocates at Supreme Court

Amid COVID-19 outbreak, the Supreme Court of India has directed advocates that they may wear "plain white shirt/salwar-kameez/saree, with a plain white neckband" during the hearings being done through Virtual Court System.

The circular issued on May 13 in the name of Secretary-General, Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar, read, "As a precautionary measure to contain the spread of COVID-19 infection under the prevailing conditions, the Competent Authority has been pleased to direct that the advocates may wear 'plain white-shirt/white-salwar-kameez/white saree, with a plain-white neckband' during the hearings before the Supreme Court of India through Virtual Court System."

It added that the system will stay in place till the "medical exigencies exist or until further orders."

The directions came into force with immediate effect, as per the circular.

Earlier yesterday, Chief Justice of India (CJI) Sharad Arvind Bobde said that doctors have advised not to wear gowns and coats, as it "makes it easier to catch virus" and spread the chances of COVID-19".

"We are advised by doctors not to wear gowns and coats (jackets), as it 'makes it easier to catch virus' and spread the chances of COVID-19. That's why we are today only in white shirt and band," the CJI said.

He said that he may also issue a dress code for other judges and lawyers who may appear through video conferencing in Supreme Court cases. On Wednesday, Judges at the top court were seen sitting wearing white shirts and band.

Generally, Supreme Court Judges have to wear gowns and coats (jackets) as well.

Whether Section 143-A Of The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Has Retrospective Application Or Not ?

Preface: 

The party who commits default in payment can be sued by a payee in the civil court by filing suit for recovery of money. However, the special provision of Section 138 under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the NIA) was inserted with effect from 01.04.1989 vide the Banking Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988. The object of the NIA is to enhance the acceptability of the cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the drawer liable for penalties in case of bouncing of cheques due to insufficiency of funds in the accounts.

That by virtue of the Amendment Act No. 20 of 2018 in the NIA, the legislature introduced Section 143-A and Section 148providing for "Power to direct interim compensation" and "Power of Appellate Court to order payment pending appeal against conviction" respectively.

Key Aspects- Section 143-A of the NIA:

i.                 Section 143-A of the NIA deals with order of payment of interim compensation; the upper limit is maximum 20% of the cheque amount.

ii.                The order as regards payment of interim compensation is made directly in favour of the complainant.

iii.               If the order of payment is made, the accused is to pay interim compensation within a period of 60 days from the date of the order and for special reason, further 30 days can be given, hence, within a total of 90 days from the date of the order.

iv.               Stage at which application under Section 143-A of the NIA can be filed: (a) In summary trials or summons case, where the accused pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint, and, (b)In any other case,upon framing of charge.

v.                Sub-section (3) of Section 143-A of the NIA states that the interim compensation shall be paid within 60 days from the date of the order passed under Sub-section (1) of Section 143-A of the NIA. However, Sub-section (1) of Section 143-A of the NIA states that the court may order the drawer to pay interim compensation. So, it leaves discretion with the trial court to pass such order of interim compensation and if such interim compensation is directed to be paid, then the ceiling limit under Sub-section (2) of Section 143-A of the NIA is 20% of the cheque amount.

vi.               Sub-section (4) of Section 143-A of the NIA states about recovery of money with interest from the complainant in case of acquittal of the accused within a period of 60 days or maximum 90 days from the date of order of acquittal of the accused.

vii.             Sub-section (5) of Section 143-A of the NIA states that interim compensation payable by the accused can be recovered by the complainant as if it were a fine under Section 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

Key Aspects- Section 148 of the NIA:

i.                 Section 148 of the NIA states that in an appeal by the drawer/accused against conviction under Section 138 of the NIA, the Appellate Court may order the appellant/drawer to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court.

ii.                 The Appellate Court may direct the release of the amount which is deposited by the appellant/drawerin the Appellate Court to the complainant/respondent, at any time during the pendency of the appeal.

iii.               If the order of payment is made, the appellant/drawer is to deposit such sum (minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court) within a period of 60 days from the date of the order and for special reason, further 30 days can be given, hence, within 90 days from the date of the order.

iv.               The order directing the deposit of money in the Appellate Court can be passed at any time during the pendency of the appeal.

v.                As per the proviso to Section 148 of the NIA, if the appellant/drawer is acquitted, the Appellate Court shall direct the complainant/respondent to repay to the appellant/drawer the amount so released, with interest (at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year) within 60 days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding 30 days as may be directed by the Appellate Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant/respondent.

Comparing Section 143-A and Section 148 of the NIA:

In the matter of: Ajay Vinodchandra Shah V/s State of Maharashtra, Criminal Writ Petition No. 258 of 2019, High Court of Bombay, Date of Decision: 14.03.2019, Coram: MridulaBhatkar, J., in Para 13 and Para 14 it was held as follows:

"13. On comparison of the language used in sections 143A and 148, one finds a difference. U/s 143A, the accused is yet to face a trial. Under sub-section (2) thereof, the interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty percent of the amount of cheque. However, under section 148, it is stated that the Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty percent of the fine. These clauses in these two sections reflect the intention of the Legislature that a person at the stage of trial is always considered innocent till he is found guilty and, therefore, the ceiling of 20% compensation is mentioned. However, in the appeal, when the first Court holds the accused guilty and thus, once he is convicted, then, the appellate Court is given the power to pass order directing the accused to deposit the amount which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court. It is further stated in section 148 that the amount payable under this sub-section (sic) shall be in addition to any interim compensation paid by the appellant under section 143A. 14. The Legislature has also taken care of the accused if at all he is not held guilty and acquitted either at the trial or in the appeal. The sub-section (4) of section 143A and the proviso to section 148 state about the repayment of the amount by the complainant to the accused. In the event of acquittal, the said amount also to be paid within 60 days from the date of the order…"

Section 143-A of the NIA operates retrospectively?

In the matter of: Punjab Tin Supply Co. V/s Central Government, (1984) 1 SCC 206, it was observed that, all laws which affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectivity if they affect vested rights and obligations unless the legislative intent is clear and compulsive; such retrospective effect may be given where there are express words giving retrospective effect or where the language used necessarily implies that such retrospective operation is intended. Hence, the question whether a statutory provision has retrospective effect or not depends primarily on the language in which it is couched. If the language is clear and unambiguous, effect will have to be given to the provision in question in accordance with its tenor; however, if the language is not clear then the court has to decide whether in the light of the surrounding circumstances retrospective effect should be given to the statutory provision or not.

According to Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, any Act of Parliament comes into operation on the day on which it receives the assent of the President. Unless it is expressed to become operational on any other date and unless a contrary intention is expressed, the Act of Parliament comes into effect qua all cases on the day of its commencement.

View Taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay: In the matter of Ajay Vinodchandra Shah (Supra), the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay observed that (Para 12 of the report):

"… It is incorrect to accept that it is to be made not (sic)applicable to the cases which are filed only after 01.09.2018 and not applicable to the cases pending earlier in the trial as well as appellate Court. Huge number of cases under section 138 of the Act are pending in the Courts. In these cases, if the plea is recorded or charge is not framed, then the trial Court can invoke its powers under Section 143-A after 1.9.2018 and can impose interim compensation which shall not exceed 20% of the amount of cheque. Same is the case in appeals. If the appeals are pending, the Court can pass interim orders under section 148…"

Thus, according to the view taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay, Section 143-A and Section 148 of the NIA do not operate prospectively.

View Taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana:

In the matter of: Ginni Garments & Anr V/s Sethi Garments, CRR No. 9872-2018 (O&M), High Court of Punjab & Haryana, Date of Decision: 04.04.2019, Coram: Rajbir Sehrawat, J., it was held that:

i.                 Whether Section 143-A and Section 148 of the NIA have prospective or retrospective operation depends upon the determination whether these provisions are substantive in nature or are merely procedural. If these provisions are substantive in nature then these provisions cannot be applied retrospectively to the pending cases, however, if these provisions are procedural in nature then they have to be applied to all the cases, including the ones pending before the court on the date, the amendment was enforced.

ii.                A bare perusal of Section 143-A of the NIA shows that Section 143-A of the NIA has given power to the trial court to order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation (maximum of 20% of the cheque amount) to the complainant, where the accused has not pleaded guilty of the accusation made against him. Moreover, as per Section 143-A of the NIA if interim compensation is not paid within 60 days (or maximum of 90 days) from the order of the court granting interim compensation, then the interim compensation can be recovered by the complainant from the drawer/accused under Section 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, as if it were a 'fine' imposed upon the drawer/accused.Section 143-A of the NIA casts a substantive obligation upon the drawer/accused.

iii.               Section 143-A of the NIA is not a procedural provision as it intends to create a 'stand-alone liability' for the drawer/accused towards the complainant which has to be discharged by the drawer/accused when the matter is still pending for adjudication before the trial court.

iv.               Although the provision of Section 143-A of the NIA cannot be applied to the pending trials, however, the situation regarding Section 148 of the NIA is drastically different. Section 148 of the NIA does not, in any way, affects the substantive right of the accused, to defend himself or to prosecute his appeal. Section 148 of the NIA categorically provides that in case the appellant/drawer is acquitted by the Appellate Court, then, the amount awarded by the Appellate Court as interim compensation shall be returned to him, by the complainant along with interest.

v.                 When the case reaches before the Appellate Court, the appellant/drawer has already acquired a status of 'convict', who has already been found guilty of his conduct and sentenced by the trial court. In case the trial court imposes a fine then making the appellant/drawer pay that amount does not affect his substantive right, rather it is a matter of procedure only. Moreover, in case the trial court imposes a fine, which can be up to twice the amount of the cheque and which can be treated as compensation to be paid to the complainant, in that situation, liability of the appellant/drawer has already been determined by the trial court and the liability to pay the amount to the complainant already exists at the time when the appellant/drawer comes before the Appellate Court.

vi.               Section 148 of the NIA is to govern all the appeals pending on the date on which it was enforced and/or appeals filed thereafter.

View Taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad:

In the matter of: Vivek Kumar Negi V/s State of U.P. &Anr., Application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. No. 11055 of 2019, High Court of Allahabad, Date of Decision: 11.04.2019, Coram: Arvind Kumar Mishra, J., the question that came for adjudication before the Hon'ble Court was this:

"… whether the amendment brought and incorporated under Section 143 (A) (1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is applicable retrospectively nor (sic) not?"

Answering the question framed above, the Hon'ble Court observed as follows:

"… In so far as amendment is concerned, the amendment is of procedural nature and not of substantive nature. Moreover, in matters of applicability of the amendment [under Section 143 (A)] proceedings launched in the matters pending prior to the incorporation of the amendment there is no express bar in the Act. It being so, the amendment will be applicable even to the proceeding pending prior to the date of incorporation of the amendment as Section 143 (A) in the matters involving provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881…"

Thus, according to the view taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad, Section 143-A of the NIA is to operate retrospectively.

View Taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka:

In the matter of: Sri V. Narasimha Murthy V/s Sri Santhosh,

 I.A. No. 3 of 2018 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 425 of 2018, High Court of Karnataka, Date of Decision: 18.02.2019,

Coram: B.A. Patil, J.,

it was held that:

i.                 According to Section 148 of the NIA, the Appellate Court may order the accused to deposit a minimum of 20% of the fine amount or the compensation awarded by the trial court and if the said amount is deposited within 60 days from the date of such order, the Appellate Court may direct the release of the amount so deposited by the accused in favour of the complainant during the pendency of the appeal. The proviso to Section 148 of the NIA states that while releasing the amount so deposited, the complainant has to be directed to repay the said amount in the event of acquittal of the accused with interest at bank rate which was prevailing during the said period.

ii.                It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective in nature, unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation.

iii.               Section 148 of the NIA has been enacted to protect the interest of the complainant and to provide relief to the complainant. Further, Section 148 of the NIA has been enacted to discourage filing of frivolous appeals. Thus, Section 148 of the NIA has to be given wider interpretation and not a restricted/pedantic interpretation.

iv.               Section 148 of the NIA has to be given retrospective effect.Section 148 of the NIA is to govern all the appeals pending on the date on which it was enforced and/or appeals filed thereafter.

Afternote:

In the matter of: G.J. Raja V/s Tejraj Surana,

Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 3342/2019, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, formulated the following question of law for adjudication:

"… whether Section 143-A introduced by the Amendment Act No. 20 of 2018 in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 has retrospective application or not?"

The aforenoted matter is still pending adjudication before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India with the next date of hearing being: 01.07.2019.

Source: https://www.livelaw.in/columns/whether-section-143-a-in-the-negotiable-instruments-act-14507

Amrapali Group Committed First Degree Crime by Cheating Home Buyers: Supreme Court

Amrapali Group has committed a "first-degree crime" by cheating thousands of home buyers and no matter how powerful the people behind this mess they will be booked and prosecuted, the Supreme Court said Tuesday.

"Fate is written on the wall" for the group and its directors, the top court said while declining to hear their claims of no wrongdoing.

The embattled real estate firm "cheated everybody including home buyers, banks and authorities and indulged in cartelization to prevent the Debt Recovery Tribunal from auctioning its unencumbered properties", it said. "The limit of your fraud touched the sky."

A bench of Justices Arun Mishra and U U Lalit said it cannot believe the justification given by Amrapali for alleged diversion of funds of over Rs 3,500 crore, looking at its dubious conduct.

"You have committed a first-degree crime by cheating thousands of home buyers. We should have cancelled the licences of statutory auditors of Amrapali for indulging in fraudulent practise long back and sent them to jail.

"We are saying in open court that there are powerful people behind this mess but no matter how powerful they are, we will book them and prosecute them. We are not going to spare anybody," the bench said.

The hard-hitting remarks of the bench came after advocates appearing for the group, said there was no wrongdoing done on their part and there was no diversion of Rs 3,500 crore as claimed by the court-appointed forensic auditors.

Luthra said forensic auditors have erred on various aspects in their report like they had claimed that not a single penny was invested by directors of Amrapali but in reality, Rs 60 to Rs 70 crore was put in by them.

"We have to believe the forensic auditors and their report looking at your dubious conduct. We believe them. You (Amrapali) have yourself admitted in your earlier affidavit that Rs 2,990 crore of home buyers money was diverted and now you are claiming that there was no diversion. You have made a peon as your director and he purchases shares worth crores of rupees for Amrapali. Is this not correct," the bench said.

Luthra said the group acted in a bona fide manner and in the interest of home buyers but the problems started after the company ran into litigation.

Amrapali Group claimed that they had received Rs 11,057 crore from the home buyers and they have constructed five projects in Indirapuram of Delhi-NCR and gave their possession to home buyers.

"Your (Amrapali Group and its directors) fate is written on the wall. We are not inclined to hear your bona fide claims looking at your dubious conduct," the bench said.

At the outset, the bench also pulled up Bank of Baroda and other lenders, who have given hefty loans to Amrapali Group for failing to monitor and control the diversion and usage of funds by the realty firms.

The day-long hearing remained inconclusive and would continue tomorrow.

Two forensic auditors -- Pawan Agrawal and Ravi Bhatia -- in their fresh report said yesterday that Amrapali has diverted over Rs 3,500 crore of home buyers money to different projects.

The top court had allowed the I-T department and the EOW to access the report of forensic auditors in their probe but restrained them from summoning them.

Forensic auditors in their fresh supplementary report pointed out that promoters of Amrapali did not invest a single penny in real estate firm and home buyers money was used for the construction of high rise buildings.

Supreme Court sets aside Centre's decision to merge FTIL and NSEL

The Supreme Court on Tuesday set aside the Centre's decision to merge National Spot Exchange Ltd (NSEL) with Financial Technologies India Ltd (FTIL), which is now known as 63 Moon Technologies Ltd.

A bench comprising justices R F Nariman and Vineet Saran delivered the judgement on a batch of petitions filed by 63 Moon Technologies Ltd challenging the Bombay High Court's December 2017 verdict upholding the Centre's decision to merge NSEL with FTIL.

In February 2016, the Centre had passed a final amalgamation order in terms of the provision of the Companies Act merging FTIL and NSEL. As per the order, all the assets and liabilities of NSEL would become assets and liabilities of FTIL.

The government's order was challenged in the high court which dismissed the petition in December 2017.

In its judgement, the apex court held that the Centre's February 2016 order was "ultra vires" to section 396 of the Companies Act and was also violative of Article 14 (equality before law) of the Constitution.

"In conclusion, though other wide-ranging arguments were made with respect to the validity of the Central Government amalgamation order, we have not addressed the same as we have held that the order dated February 12, 2016, is ultra vires Section 396 of the Companies Act, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India for the reasons stated by us hereinabove," the bench said.

"The appeals are accordingly allowed, and the impugned judgment of the Bombay High Court is set aside," the apex court said.

The bench held that the merger of NSEL and FTIL did not satisfy the criteria of "public interest".

"Thus, it is clear that no reasonable body of persons properly instructed in law could possibly hold, on the facts of this case, that compulsory amalgamation between FTIL and NSEL would be in public interest," the bench noted.

After the apex court's verdict, Jignesh Shah, chairman emeritus and mentor of 63 Moons Technologies Ltd, said in a press statement, "We have always had full faith in the Indian judiciary and our courts. Finally, truth has prevailed."

NSEL had shut down in 2013 after a major payment default and it was ordered not to enter into any fresh contracts by Forward Markets Commission (FMC), which has since been integrated into the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI).

On July 31, 2013, NSEL, then 99.99 per cent subsidiary of FTIL, had defaulted in nearly Rs 5,600 crore payments to its around 13,000 investors.

After the crisis, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) had decided to issue a final order for the merger of NSEL with FTIL under section 396 of the Companies Act, 1956.

In February 2016, the MCA had passed a final order directing the merger of scam-hit NSEL with FTIL.

https://www.businesstoday.in/top-story/supreme-court-sets-aside-centre-decision-to-merge-ftil-and-nsel/story/342130.htm

WHETHER FLAT BUYERS CAN INITIATE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST BUILDERS UNDER THE IBC?

Nikhi l Mehta & Sons (HUF) & Ors. v. M/s AMR Infrastructures Ltd. (NCLT Delhi), 
C.P NO. (ISB)-03(PB)/2017, decided on 23.01.2017

In this case the NCLAT has ruled that a purchaser of real estate, under an 'Assured-return' plan, would be considered as a 'Financial Creditor' for the purposes of IBC and is, therefore, entitled to initiate corporate insolvency process against the builder, in case of non-payment of such 'Assured/Committed return' and non-delivery of unit. NCLAT further went on to rule that the 'debt' in this case was disbursed against the consideration for the 'time value of money' which is the primary ingredient that is required to be satisfied in order for an arrangement to qualify as 'Financial Debt' and for the lender to qualify as a 'Financial Creditor', under the scheme of IBC.

WHETHER THE IBC CAN BE INVOKED IN RESPECT OF AN OPERATIONAL DEBT WHERE AN ARBITRAL AWARD HAS BEEN PASSED AGAINST THE OPERATIONAL DEBTOR, WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN FINALLY ADJUDICATED UPON?

K. Kishan vs. M/s Vijay Nirman Company Pvt. Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 21824 of 2017 decided on 14.08.2018

The court held that the filing of a Section 34 petition against an Arbitral Award shows that a pre-existing dispute which culminates at the first stage of the proceedings in an Award, continues even after the Award, at least till the final adjudicatory process under Sections 34 & 37 has taken place. However, court clarified that there may be cases where a Section 34 petition challenging an Arbitral Award may clearly and unequivocally be barred by limitation, in that it can be demonstrated to the Court that the period of 90 days plus the discretionary period of 30 days has clearly expired, after which either no petition under Section 34 has been filed or a belated petition under Section 34 has been filed. It is only in such clear cases that the insolvency process may then be put into operation.

Supreme Court Dismisses Plea To Review Decision On Kohinoor Diamond

The Supreme Court has given the legal burial to a case which had sought judicial intervention to reclaim the 108-carat Kohinoor diamond from the United Kingdom.

A five-judge bench headed by Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi dismissed a curative petition seeking to re-examine its 2017 verdict in which it had said that it cannot pass order for reclaiming Kohinoor diamond from the UK or to stop it from being auctioned.

Kohinoor, which means Mountain of Light, is a large, colourless diamond that was found in Southern India in early 14th century.

The 108-carat Kohinoor gem, which fell into British hands during the colonial era, is the subject of a historic ownership dispute and claimed by at least four countries including India.

"We have gone through the curative petition and the connected papers. In our opinion, no case is made out within the parameters indicated in the decision of this court in the case of Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra & another....Hence, the curative petition is dismissed," said the bench, also comprising Justices SA Bobde, NV Ramana, DY Chandrachud and SK Kaul, in its recent order.

Curative petition is heard in the chamber of judges in the absence of lawyers.

The top court had in April 2017 disposed of pleas filed by an NGO and others seeking directions to bring back the treasured diamond to India saying it cannot ask a foreign government not to auction a property.

The court had made it clear it could not pass an order with regard to a property which was in another country.

In its order, the court had referred to an affidavit filed by the Centre and said that "the Government of India continues to explore ways and means with the UK government on the issue".

The Centre had earlier told the apex court that Kohinoor was neither "forcibly taken", nor "stolen" by British rulers but given to the East India Company by the rulers of Punjab.

The pleas had sought directions to the Indian High Commissioner in the UK for the return of the diamond, besides several other treasures.

After the April 2017 order, a plea seeking review of the verdict was filed in the top court.

COMMENT

The review plea was dismissed by the court in November 2017.

Supreme Court orders mediation to settle Ayodhya land dispute, appoints 3-member panel

The Supreme Court's Constitution Bench on Friday referred the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid land dispute case for a court-appointed and monitored mediation to find a 'permanent solution'.

Justice Khalifullah (Retd) will be heading the mediation proceedings while the other two members will be - Sri Sri Ravi Shankar and senior advocate Shriram Panchu.

The top court also said that the mediation proceedings should be held on-camera. "Court monitored mediation proceedings will be confidential," Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi said.

It will begin within a week and is meant to be completed in eight weeks. The first status report on mediation is supposed to be given within four weeks.

 In its order, the Supreme Court said, ''Mediators can co-opt more on the panel if necessary. Uttar Pradesh government will provide mediators all the facilities in Faizabad. Mediators can seek further legal assistance as and when required.''

Reacting to SC order, Swami Chakrapani, president of All Hindu Mahasabha, said, "We accept the Supreme Court order. We are happy with it. We are glad that Sri Sri Ravishankar is part of the mediation panel. I am sure that everything will go well."

Varun Kumar Sinha, advocate for Hindu Mahasabha, said, "Our past experience with mediation has not been good. I hope the apex court has taken this into consideration."

A five-judge Constitution Bench headed by CJI Gogoi had on Wednesday reserved the order after hearing various contesting parties.

Hindu bodies except Nirmohi Akhara have opposed the suggestion of the Supreme Court to refer the issue for mediation, while Muslim bodies have supported it.

The Constitution Bench, also comprising Justices SA Bobde, DY Chandrachud, Ashok Bhushan and SA Nazeer, concluded the hearing by asking stakeholders to give the names of possible mediators. 

Hindu bodies like Nirmohi Akhara suggested the names of Justices (retd) Kurian Joseph, AK Patnaik and GS Singhvi as mediators, while the Hindu Mahasabha faction of Swami Chakrapani proposed the names of former CJIs Justices JS Khehar and Dipak Misra, and Justice (retd) AK Patnaik to the bench.

Supreme Court also restrained media from reporting proceedings of mediation in Ayodhya case. It has directed in-camera proceedings of mediation in Ayodhya case. 

Fourteen appeals have been filed in the apex court against the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment, delivered in four civil suits, that the 2.77-acre land in Ayodhya be partitioned equally among the three parties - the Sunni Waqf Board, the Nirmohi Akhara and Ram Lalla. 

https://zeenews.india.com/india/sc-orders-court-monitored-mediation-to-resolve-ram-janmabhoomi-babri-masjid-land-dispute-case-2186007.html

departmental as well as criminal proceedings against government servants to be conducted simultaneously

The departmental and criminal proceedings against the erring Government servants will now be conducted simultaneously and necessary instructions in this regard have been passed to all the Administrative Secretaries for prompt and strict compliance.
The Supreme Court in its judgement in case titled “State of Rajasthan Versus BK Meena and Others” dated September 27, 1996 had made it clear that the approach and the objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct and different.
Moreover, the Apex Court in its judgment delivered in a case titled “State Bank of India and Others Versus Neelam Nag” on September 16, 2016 had mentioned that there is no legal bar to the holding of the disciplinary proceedings and the criminal trial simultaneously.
However, despite these explicit judgments of the highest court of the country, there was lack of clarity in Jammu and Kashmir regarding initiation of departmental proceedings in cases where criminal proceedings have either been sanctioned or the proceedings in the criminal case have been stayed by a higher forum. Due to this, the authorities were preferring to await conclusion of the criminal proceedings before initiating departmental proceedings.
Recently, on the directions of the Chief Secretary BVR Subrahmanyam, the plethora of judgments of the Apex Court were minutely examined by a group of senior officers in consultation with the Department of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and finally the issue regarding conduct of departmental enquiry in general cases and in particular where prosecution stands sanctioned has been settled.
“The matter has been commented upon by the Apex Court in plethora of judicial pronouncements and the Apex Court has held that there is no legal bar in simultaneous conduct of departmental proceedings along with the criminal proceedings”, the Commissioner Secretary to Government, General Administration Department Hilal Ahmad said in a circular issued today.
“It is a settled legal position that the criminal proceedings and the departmental proceedings can be held simultaneously except in the cases where the court has specifically restrained the Government from undertaking departmental proceedings”, the circular said.
Accordingly, the General Administration Department has directed all the departments to initiate departmental proceedings in all such criminal cases where the criminal proceedings have been initiated and the alleged criminal act amounts to misconduct and attracts the provisions of Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1956.
“The departments should accordingly take recourse and strictly adhere to the Rules of 1956 wherever departmental enquiry in such cases has to be initiated”, the circular said.
It is pertinent to mention here that in its judgment in the case titled “State of Rajasthan Versus BK Meena and Others”, the Apex Court had held: “In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment whereas in the criminal proceedings the question is whether offences registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act are established and if established what sentence should be imposed upon him”.
“The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceedings should not be matter of course but a considered decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may require reconsideration with the criminal case gets unduly delayed”, the judgment further reads.
Similarly, the Supreme Court judgment in the case titled “State Bank of India and Others Versus Neelam Nag” read: “Suffice it to say that while there is no legal bar to the holding of the disciplinary proceedings and the criminal trial simultaneously, stay of the disciplinary proceedings may be advisable course in cases where the criminal charge against the employee is grave and continuance of the disciplinary proceedings is likely to prejudice their defence before the criminal court”.
“Gravity of the charge is, however, not by itself enough to determine the question unless the charge involves complicated question of the law. The court examining the question must also keep in mind that criminal trials get prolonged indefinitely especially where the number of accused arraigned for trial is large. The court, therefore, has to draw a balance between the need for a fair trial to the accused on the one hand and the competing demand for an expeditious conclusion of the ongoing disciplinary proceedings on the other. Moreover, an early conclusion of the disciplinary proceeding has itself been seen to be in the interest of the employees”.

whether the NCLAT can dismiss a statutory appeal?

 On 18 May 2018, in M/s B Himmatlal Agrawal (Appellant) v Competition Commission of India (CCI) and Anr. [Civil Appeal No. 5029 of 2018], the Supreme Court of India (Supreme Court) distinguished the decision of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) while disposing of a statutory appeal under the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act).

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the NCLAT can dismiss a statutory appeal for non-compliance of its interlocutory direction to deposit a portion of the penalty as a condition for grant of interim relief. In this instant case, the Supreme Court set aside part of the NCLAT's order and restored the appeal that had been dismissed by the NCLAT. 

Background

The CCI found the Appellant guilty of rigging the bids for tenders floated by Western Coalfields Limited and correspondingly imposed a penalty of INR 3,61,00,000, which was ordered to be deposited within 60 days (CCI Order). The Appellant filed an appeal before the NCLAT against the CCI Order, seeking inter alia a stay of the penalty deposit. In response, the NCLAT granted a stay against the CCI Order (NCLAT Stay Order), with a condition that the Appellant was to deposit a sum equal to 10% of the total penalty (Deposit). However, the Appellant was unable to execute the Deposit due to financial distress. Consequently, the NCLAT dismissed the appeal on the ground of non-compliance with the NCLAT Stay Order. Being aggrieved, the Appellant filed an appeal against the NCLAT's decision before the Supreme Court.

Decision of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court recognised that the right to appeal is provided under Section 53B of the Competition Act and that the said provision does not require any pre-deposit of penalty for entertaining an appeal. The Supreme Court held that the right to appeal granted by a statute cannot be curtailed by imposing a condition of pre-deposit of penalty, which can result in the dismissal of the appeal, if such deposit is not satisfied.

The Supreme Court declared that non-compliance of the NCLAT Stay Order will not impact the substantive appeal. As the condition of deposit was attached to the NCLAT Stay Order, any non-compliance would result in the NCLAT Stay Order ceasing to operate, as the pre-condition is not fulfilled. However, the substantive appeal would have to be decided on merits after giving the involved parties an opportunity to be heard.

As a result, the Supreme Court set aside part of the NCLAT Stay Order and directed that the appeal be restored and decided on merits. The stay order remained vacated on ground of the non-compliance.

http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/707524/Antitrust+Competition/Supreme+Court+Clarifies+NCLATs+Powers+In+Appeal

CLAT 2018- SC Suggests To Form Nodal Agency To Examine The Grievances Of Candidates, Asks NUALS To Reply

The Supreme Court today asked Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) 2018 convenor Nuals Kochi to appoint an expert committee at the earliest to individually look into at least 251 CLAT 2018 candidates’ grievances with the conduct of the entrance exam this year.

Justices AM Khanwilkar and Navin Sinha heard senior advocate Salman Khurshid for CLAT 2018 candidate Disha Panchal and five other petitioners who had challenged the exam and asked for a stay on the results and for a fresh exam, on the ground that they suffered from precious time lost in answering the paper due to technical glitches in the conduct of the exam.

Senior advocate V Giri appeared for Nuals today and placed on record the computer “log reports” of the petitioners claiming that each of the six petitioners was compensated with extra time for the exact time lost on account of technical glitches.

Nuals also submitted that out of over 59,300 candidates who appeared for the CLAT 2018 LLB and LLM entrance exams, it has received 251 representations so far from aggrieved candidates claiming that they had suffered on account of errors and glitches in the exam, the petitioners’ counsel Anand Shankar Jha told us.

This leaves out possibly up to 2,120 other potentially aggrieved candidates, according to a Google form that had been opened up to responses by a free CLAT tutorial service.

Jha said that the court was of the prima facie view that there were indeed many glitches in the conduct of the exam and that Nuals should appoint a mechanism or constitute a committee to look into each individual grievance.

The judges asked Nuals to propose before the court tomorrow as to how soon it can constitute such a committee and what procedure the committee would follow to address candidates’ grievances.

The court also ordered a stay on the writ proceedings on before five other benches of various high courts by several CLAT 2018 candidates, i.e. before Rajasthan - Jodhpur and Jaipur, Punjab & Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Delhi, making their outcome subject to the decision of the Supreme Court.

Additional solicitor general appeared for the ministry of human resource development (MHRD), which was also made a respondent in the case.

Jha said that the hearings in the matter will now proceed on a day to day basis and the next hearing is tomorrow.

https://www.legallyindia.com/pre-law-student/clatinsc-nuals-to-propose-mechanism-to-look-into-251-candidates-complaints-as-2000-other-unrepresentated-sc-stays-clat-2018-proceedings-in-all-hcs-20180524-9366

Supreme Court: No relief to LLB Student Short Of Attendance Due To Pregnancy.

The Supreme Court on Wednesday refused to grant attendance relaxation to a second-year student of the LL.B course of Faculty of Law, University of Delhi (DU) who had missed college due to her pregnancy.

The Petitioner, Ms. Ankita Meena had sought a direction to DU to permit her to appear in the IV semester LL.B Examination. She could not meet the requisite 70% attendance criteria, having missed almost 2 months of the semester due to her pregnancy.

The Supreme Court vacation bench of Justices A. M. Khanwilkar and Navin Sinha declined interim relief of being permitted to sit for her fourth semester examination scheduled at 2 PM on Wednesday.

The bench was hearing the SLP preferred by Ms. Meena against the May 15 judgment of the Delhi High Court, wherein the Single Judge had placed reliance on University of Delhi v. Vandana Katari and Sukriti Upadhyay v. University of Delhi, besides Rule 12 of the BCI Rules of Legal Education, in refusing to grant her attendance relaxation.

Dismissing the SLP, the bench on Wednesday noted, “even maternity leave was not applied for… the objective of stipulating rules is to secure a sense of discipline…we cannot direct at 1 PM that a candidate may be allowed to take the examination at 2 PM...”

The bench, however, granted liberty to the petitioner to approach the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. At an earlier stage, the bench had signified its consent to an arrangement that may be effected in this behalf with the acquiescence of the Respondent University.

In her petition, Ms. Meena had claimed a contravention of Rule 2(9)(d) of Ordinance VII of Chapter III of Delhi University Act of 1922, of her Fundamental Rights under Articles 19(1)(g), 14 and 21, her DPSP under Article 42 and the State’s Fundamental Duty under Article 51(c) [in the light of India being a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women], besides the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act.

She also referred to the landmark judgment in Air India v. Nargesh Meerza. The relevant extract of the said Rule 2(9)(d) reads as follows:

“In the case of a married woman student who is granted maternity leave, in calculating the total number of lectures delivered in the College or in the University, as the case may be, for her course of study in each academic year, the number of lectures in each subject delivered during the period of her maternity leave shall not be taken into account:”

The High Court had, however, noted that the position had been settled by a decision by the Division Bench of the Court in the case of University of Delhi & Anr. v. Vandana Kandari & Anr., wherein the Court had held that maternity leave cannot be put in a different compartment for the purposes of relaxation of attendance. The Court had further highlighted the fact that LL.B. is a “a special professional course where no relaxation can be granted contrary to the Bar Council of India Rules, which specifically governs the field.” It had then dismissed the Petition, observing, “In my considered view, once Rule 12 of Rules of Legal Education of the Bar Council of India prescribes a mandatory attendance of 70% in each semester of LLB, no reliance can be placed on Rule 2 (9) (d) of Ordinance VII of Chapter III of Delhi University, which is a general provision that does not deal with a professional course like LLB.”

Complaint Of Domestic Violence Can Be Filed Even After Divorce: Supreme Court

A woman can lodge a complaint under the domestic violence law against the excesses committed by her husband even after the dissolution of marriage, the Supreme Court has said.

The top court refused to interfere with the order of the Rajasthan High Court which held that the absence of subsisting domestic relationship in no manner prevents a court from granting relief to the aggrieved woman.

The high court had passed the order while adjudicating a matrimonial dispute.

A bench of justices Ranjan Gogoi, R Banumathi and Navin Sinha dismissed the appeal against the high court verdict, saying it was not inclined to interfere with the order in the facts of the case.

It was contented that husband-wife relationship often ends on an acrimonious note and if the provisions of the Act were allowed to be used retrospectively, then it would further increase the acrimony and rule out the possibility of any compromise.

He said that legislature's purposive interpretation has to be kept in mind while interpreting any provisions of the law.

The bench, however, refused to agree and declined to interfere with the high court order in the facts of the case.

The high court had held on October 30, 2013 that the subsistence of marriage or domestic relationship was not a condition precedent for an aggrieved person to invoke the protection orders and other reliefs under the provisions of the Act.

"If the aggrieved person had been in domestic relationship at any point of time even prior to coming into the force of the Act and was subjected to domestic violence, the person is entitled to invoke the remedial measures provided under the Act,

The high court had said cited an example saying that even after the dissolution of marriage between the parties, if an ex-husband attempts to commit an act of violence such as entering the place of employment of the divorced wife, trying to establish contact with her or causing violence to her dependents or other relatives, she is not precluded from seeking protection orders under the law.

If the divorced husband attempts to dispossess the woman from the shared household or property jointly owned, she can approach a court for appropriate relief.

https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/complaint-of-domestic-violence-cruelty-against-can-be-filed-even-after-divorce-says-supreme-court-1851293