SC extends limitation for Arbitration Act, Negotiable Instruments Act cases

The Supreme Court on Wednesday extended the period of limitation for cheque bounce cases and arbitration proceedings amid the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdown.

A Bench led by Chief Justice S.A. Bobde issued notice to the government through the Attorney-General to find if there were other laws which require extension of limitation period.

On March 23, the court had used its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to lift the limitation period for all cases across tribunals and courts until further notice to obviate difficulties and ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file proceedings.

The “period of limitation” is the maximum time set by a statute beyond which the alleged violator faces legal action.

“In view of this court’s earlier order on March 23 and taking into consideration the effect of the COVID-19 and resultant difficulties being faced by the lawyers and litigants and with a view to obviate such difficulties and to ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to come physically to file such proceedings in respective Courts/Tribunal across the country including this Court, it is hereby ordered that all periods of limitation prescribed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 shall be extended with effect from March 15 , 2020 till further orders,” the Supreme Court order read.

In case the limitation has expired after March 15, then it would be extended for 15 days post the lifting of the lockdown.

Whether Section 143-A Of The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Has Retrospective Application Or Not ?

Preface: 

The party who commits default in payment can be sued by a payee in the civil court by filing suit for recovery of money. However, the special provision of Section 138 under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the NIA) was inserted with effect from 01.04.1989 vide the Banking Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988. The object of the NIA is to enhance the acceptability of the cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the drawer liable for penalties in case of bouncing of cheques due to insufficiency of funds in the accounts.

That by virtue of the Amendment Act No. 20 of 2018 in the NIA, the legislature introduced Section 143-A and Section 148providing for "Power to direct interim compensation" and "Power of Appellate Court to order payment pending appeal against conviction" respectively.

Key Aspects- Section 143-A of the NIA:

i.                 Section 143-A of the NIA deals with order of payment of interim compensation; the upper limit is maximum 20% of the cheque amount.

ii.                The order as regards payment of interim compensation is made directly in favour of the complainant.

iii.               If the order of payment is made, the accused is to pay interim compensation within a period of 60 days from the date of the order and for special reason, further 30 days can be given, hence, within a total of 90 days from the date of the order.

iv.               Stage at which application under Section 143-A of the NIA can be filed: (a) In summary trials or summons case, where the accused pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint, and, (b)In any other case,upon framing of charge.

v.                Sub-section (3) of Section 143-A of the NIA states that the interim compensation shall be paid within 60 days from the date of the order passed under Sub-section (1) of Section 143-A of the NIA. However, Sub-section (1) of Section 143-A of the NIA states that the court may order the drawer to pay interim compensation. So, it leaves discretion with the trial court to pass such order of interim compensation and if such interim compensation is directed to be paid, then the ceiling limit under Sub-section (2) of Section 143-A of the NIA is 20% of the cheque amount.

vi.               Sub-section (4) of Section 143-A of the NIA states about recovery of money with interest from the complainant in case of acquittal of the accused within a period of 60 days or maximum 90 days from the date of order of acquittal of the accused.

vii.             Sub-section (5) of Section 143-A of the NIA states that interim compensation payable by the accused can be recovered by the complainant as if it were a fine under Section 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

Key Aspects- Section 148 of the NIA:

i.                 Section 148 of the NIA states that in an appeal by the drawer/accused against conviction under Section 138 of the NIA, the Appellate Court may order the appellant/drawer to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court.

ii.                 The Appellate Court may direct the release of the amount which is deposited by the appellant/drawerin the Appellate Court to the complainant/respondent, at any time during the pendency of the appeal.

iii.               If the order of payment is made, the appellant/drawer is to deposit such sum (minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court) within a period of 60 days from the date of the order and for special reason, further 30 days can be given, hence, within 90 days from the date of the order.

iv.               The order directing the deposit of money in the Appellate Court can be passed at any time during the pendency of the appeal.

v.                As per the proviso to Section 148 of the NIA, if the appellant/drawer is acquitted, the Appellate Court shall direct the complainant/respondent to repay to the appellant/drawer the amount so released, with interest (at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year) within 60 days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding 30 days as may be directed by the Appellate Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant/respondent.

Comparing Section 143-A and Section 148 of the NIA:

In the matter of: Ajay Vinodchandra Shah V/s State of Maharashtra, Criminal Writ Petition No. 258 of 2019, High Court of Bombay, Date of Decision: 14.03.2019, Coram: MridulaBhatkar, J., in Para 13 and Para 14 it was held as follows:

"13. On comparison of the language used in sections 143A and 148, one finds a difference. U/s 143A, the accused is yet to face a trial. Under sub-section (2) thereof, the interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty percent of the amount of cheque. However, under section 148, it is stated that the Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty percent of the fine. These clauses in these two sections reflect the intention of the Legislature that a person at the stage of trial is always considered innocent till he is found guilty and, therefore, the ceiling of 20% compensation is mentioned. However, in the appeal, when the first Court holds the accused guilty and thus, once he is convicted, then, the appellate Court is given the power to pass order directing the accused to deposit the amount which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court. It is further stated in section 148 that the amount payable under this sub-section (sic) shall be in addition to any interim compensation paid by the appellant under section 143A. 14. The Legislature has also taken care of the accused if at all he is not held guilty and acquitted either at the trial or in the appeal. The sub-section (4) of section 143A and the proviso to section 148 state about the repayment of the amount by the complainant to the accused. In the event of acquittal, the said amount also to be paid within 60 days from the date of the order…"

Section 143-A of the NIA operates retrospectively?

In the matter of: Punjab Tin Supply Co. V/s Central Government, (1984) 1 SCC 206, it was observed that, all laws which affect substantive rights generally operate prospectively and there is a presumption against their retrospectivity if they affect vested rights and obligations unless the legislative intent is clear and compulsive; such retrospective effect may be given where there are express words giving retrospective effect or where the language used necessarily implies that such retrospective operation is intended. Hence, the question whether a statutory provision has retrospective effect or not depends primarily on the language in which it is couched. If the language is clear and unambiguous, effect will have to be given to the provision in question in accordance with its tenor; however, if the language is not clear then the court has to decide whether in the light of the surrounding circumstances retrospective effect should be given to the statutory provision or not.

According to Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, any Act of Parliament comes into operation on the day on which it receives the assent of the President. Unless it is expressed to become operational on any other date and unless a contrary intention is expressed, the Act of Parliament comes into effect qua all cases on the day of its commencement.

View Taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay: In the matter of Ajay Vinodchandra Shah (Supra), the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay observed that (Para 12 of the report):

"… It is incorrect to accept that it is to be made not (sic)applicable to the cases which are filed only after 01.09.2018 and not applicable to the cases pending earlier in the trial as well as appellate Court. Huge number of cases under section 138 of the Act are pending in the Courts. In these cases, if the plea is recorded or charge is not framed, then the trial Court can invoke its powers under Section 143-A after 1.9.2018 and can impose interim compensation which shall not exceed 20% of the amount of cheque. Same is the case in appeals. If the appeals are pending, the Court can pass interim orders under section 148…"

Thus, according to the view taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay, Section 143-A and Section 148 of the NIA do not operate prospectively.

View Taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana:

In the matter of: Ginni Garments & Anr V/s Sethi Garments, CRR No. 9872-2018 (O&M), High Court of Punjab & Haryana, Date of Decision: 04.04.2019, Coram: Rajbir Sehrawat, J., it was held that:

i.                 Whether Section 143-A and Section 148 of the NIA have prospective or retrospective operation depends upon the determination whether these provisions are substantive in nature or are merely procedural. If these provisions are substantive in nature then these provisions cannot be applied retrospectively to the pending cases, however, if these provisions are procedural in nature then they have to be applied to all the cases, including the ones pending before the court on the date, the amendment was enforced.

ii.                A bare perusal of Section 143-A of the NIA shows that Section 143-A of the NIA has given power to the trial court to order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation (maximum of 20% of the cheque amount) to the complainant, where the accused has not pleaded guilty of the accusation made against him. Moreover, as per Section 143-A of the NIA if interim compensation is not paid within 60 days (or maximum of 90 days) from the order of the court granting interim compensation, then the interim compensation can be recovered by the complainant from the drawer/accused under Section 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, as if it were a 'fine' imposed upon the drawer/accused.Section 143-A of the NIA casts a substantive obligation upon the drawer/accused.

iii.               Section 143-A of the NIA is not a procedural provision as it intends to create a 'stand-alone liability' for the drawer/accused towards the complainant which has to be discharged by the drawer/accused when the matter is still pending for adjudication before the trial court.

iv.               Although the provision of Section 143-A of the NIA cannot be applied to the pending trials, however, the situation regarding Section 148 of the NIA is drastically different. Section 148 of the NIA does not, in any way, affects the substantive right of the accused, to defend himself or to prosecute his appeal. Section 148 of the NIA categorically provides that in case the appellant/drawer is acquitted by the Appellate Court, then, the amount awarded by the Appellate Court as interim compensation shall be returned to him, by the complainant along with interest.

v.                 When the case reaches before the Appellate Court, the appellant/drawer has already acquired a status of 'convict', who has already been found guilty of his conduct and sentenced by the trial court. In case the trial court imposes a fine then making the appellant/drawer pay that amount does not affect his substantive right, rather it is a matter of procedure only. Moreover, in case the trial court imposes a fine, which can be up to twice the amount of the cheque and which can be treated as compensation to be paid to the complainant, in that situation, liability of the appellant/drawer has already been determined by the trial court and the liability to pay the amount to the complainant already exists at the time when the appellant/drawer comes before the Appellate Court.

vi.               Section 148 of the NIA is to govern all the appeals pending on the date on which it was enforced and/or appeals filed thereafter.

View Taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad:

In the matter of: Vivek Kumar Negi V/s State of U.P. &Anr., Application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. No. 11055 of 2019, High Court of Allahabad, Date of Decision: 11.04.2019, Coram: Arvind Kumar Mishra, J., the question that came for adjudication before the Hon'ble Court was this:

"… whether the amendment brought and incorporated under Section 143 (A) (1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is applicable retrospectively nor (sic) not?"

Answering the question framed above, the Hon'ble Court observed as follows:

"… In so far as amendment is concerned, the amendment is of procedural nature and not of substantive nature. Moreover, in matters of applicability of the amendment [under Section 143 (A)] proceedings launched in the matters pending prior to the incorporation of the amendment there is no express bar in the Act. It being so, the amendment will be applicable even to the proceeding pending prior to the date of incorporation of the amendment as Section 143 (A) in the matters involving provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881…"

Thus, according to the view taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad, Section 143-A of the NIA is to operate retrospectively.

View Taken by the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka:

In the matter of: Sri V. Narasimha Murthy V/s Sri Santhosh,

 I.A. No. 3 of 2018 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 425 of 2018, High Court of Karnataka, Date of Decision: 18.02.2019,

Coram: B.A. Patil, J.,

it was held that:

i.                 According to Section 148 of the NIA, the Appellate Court may order the accused to deposit a minimum of 20% of the fine amount or the compensation awarded by the trial court and if the said amount is deposited within 60 days from the date of such order, the Appellate Court may direct the release of the amount so deposited by the accused in favour of the complainant during the pendency of the appeal. The proviso to Section 148 of the NIA states that while releasing the amount so deposited, the complainant has to be directed to repay the said amount in the event of acquittal of the accused with interest at bank rate which was prevailing during the said period.

ii.                It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective in nature, unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation.

iii.               Section 148 of the NIA has been enacted to protect the interest of the complainant and to provide relief to the complainant. Further, Section 148 of the NIA has been enacted to discourage filing of frivolous appeals. Thus, Section 148 of the NIA has to be given wider interpretation and not a restricted/pedantic interpretation.

iv.               Section 148 of the NIA has to be given retrospective effect.Section 148 of the NIA is to govern all the appeals pending on the date on which it was enforced and/or appeals filed thereafter.

Afternote:

In the matter of: G.J. Raja V/s Tejraj Surana,

Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 3342/2019, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, formulated the following question of law for adjudication:

"… whether Section 143-A introduced by the Amendment Act No. 20 of 2018 in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 has retrospective application or not?"

The aforenoted matter is still pending adjudication before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India with the next date of hearing being: 01.07.2019.

Source: https://www.livelaw.in/columns/whether-section-143-a-in-the-negotiable-instruments-act-14507

Dis-honour of Cheque cases can be filed only to the Court within whose local jurisdiction, the offence was Committed; ie, where the cheque is dishonoured by the bank on which it is drawn. Bhaskaran Vs Balan (1999) which allowed Five territorial Jurisdictions overruled

A three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court finally held that  a Complaint of Dis-honour of Cheque can be filed only  to  the  Court  within  whose  local jurisdiction the offence was committed, which  in  the  present  context  is where the cheque is dishonoured by the bank on which it is drawn. The Court clarified that the Complainant  is  statutorily  bound  to comply with Section 177 etc. of the CrPC and therefore the  place  or  situs where the Section 138 Complaint is to be filed is not of his choosing. The Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. Overruled the two Judge Bench Judgment in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan  Balan  (1999)  7 SCC 510 wherein  it was held that “the offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts. Following are the acts which are components of the said offence : (1) Drawing of the cheque, (2) Presentation of the cheque to the bank, (3) Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, (4) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice”.” if the five different acts were done in five different localities any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In other words, the complainant can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done.” The Court accepted the view of another two Judge Bench Judgment in Harman  Electronics  Pvt.Ltd. v. National Panasonic India Pvt. Ltd. (2009) 1  SCC  720. “It is one thing to say that sending of a notice is one of the ingredients for maintaining the complaint but it is another thing to say that dishonour of a cheque by itself constitutes an offence. For the purpose of proving its case that the accused had committed an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the ingredients thereof are required to be  proved. What would constitute an offence is stated in the main provision. The proviso appended thereto, however, imposes certain further conditions which are required to be fulfilled before cognizance of the offence can be taken. If the ingredients for constitution of the offence laid down in the provisos (a), (b) and (c) appended to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act intended to be applied in favour of the accused, there cannot be any doubt that receipt of a notice would ultimately give rise to the cause of action for filing a complaint. As it is only on receipt of the notice the accused at his own peril may refuse to pay the amount. Clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 138 therefore must be read together. Issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action but communication of the notice would.”.

Justice Vikramjit Sen who wrote the main Judgment held that “We  respectfully agree  with  this  statement  of  law  and  underscore  that   in   criminal jurisprudence there is  a  discernibly  demarcated  difference  between  the commission of an offence and its  cognizance  leading  to  prosecution.  The

Harman  approach  is  significant  and  sounds  a  discordant  note  to  the Bhaskaran ratio.  Harman also highlights the reality  that  Section  138  of the NI Act is being rampantly misused so  far  as  territorial  jurisdiction for trial of the Complaint is concerned.  With the passage of time  equities have therefore transferred from one end of the pendulum to  the  other.   It is now not uncommon for the Courts to encounter the issuance of a notice  in compliance with clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act  from a situs which bears no connection with the Accused or with any facet of  the transaction between the parties, leave aside the place where  the  dishonour of the cheque has taken place.  This is also the  position  as  regards  the presentation of the cheque, dishonour  of  which  is  then  pleaded  as  the territorial platform of the Complaint under  Section  138  of  the  NI  Act.

Harman, in fact,  duly  heeds  the  absurd  and  stressful  situation,  fast becoming common-place where several cheques signed by the  same  drawer  are presented  for  encashment  and  requisite  notices  of  demand   are   also despatched from different places.  It appears to us that justifiably  so  at that time, the conclusion in Bhaskaran was influenced in  large  measure  by curial compassion towards the unpaid payee/holder, whereas with the  passage of two decades  the  manipulative  abuse  of  territorial  jurisdiction  has become a recurring and piquant factor.  The liberal  approach  preferred  in Bhaskaran now calls for a stricter interpretation of the statute,  precisely because of its  misemployment  so  far  as  choice  of  place  of  suing  is concerned.  These are the circumstances which have propelled us to  minutely consider the decisions rendered by two-Judge Benches of this Court.

The Court found that the two Judge Benches of the Supreme Court and various High Courts are following the above two Judgments at their discretion. It is held that “The territorial jurisdiction conundrum which, candidly is currently  in  the cauldron owing to varying if not  conflicting  ratios,  has  been  cogitated upon very recently by a two-Judge Bench in Criminal Appeal  No.808  of  2013 titled Nishant Aggarwal v. Kailash Kumar  Sharma  decided  on  1.7.2013  and again by the same Bench in Criminal Appeal No.1457 of  2013  titled  Escorts Limited v. Rama Mukherjee decided on  17.09.2013.   Bhaskaran  was  followed and Ishar Alloy and Harman were explained.

Justice T.S.Takur who wrote a separate but concurrent opinion held that “Three recent decisions need be mentioned  at  this  stage  which  have followed Bhaskaran and attempted to reconcile the ratio of  that  case  with the subsequent decisions in Ishar Alloy Steels and  Harman  Electronics.  In Nishant Aggarwal v. Kailash Kumar Sharma (2013) 10 SCC  72  this  Court  was once again dealing with a case where the complaint had been filed  in  Court at Bhiwani in Haryana within whose territorial jurisdiction the  complainant had presented the cheque for encashment, although the cheque was drawn on  a bank at Gauhati in Assam. Relying upon the  view  taken  in  Bhaskaran  this Court held that the Bhiwani Court had jurisdiction to deal with the  matter. While saying so, the  Court  tried  to  distinguish  the  three-Judge  Bench decision  in  Ishar  Alloy  Steels  (supra)  and  that  rendered  in  Harman Electronics case (supra) to hold that the ratio of those decisions  did  not dilute the principle stated in Bhaskaran case. That  exercise  was  repeated by this Court in FIL Industries Ltd. v. Imtiyaz Ahmad Bhat (2014) 2 SCC  266 and in Escorts Ltd. v. Rama Mukherjee (2014) 2 SCC 255  which  too  followed Bhaskaran and held that complaint under Section  138  Negotiable  Instrument Act could be instituted at any  one  of  the  five  places  referred  to  in Bhaskaran’s case.

We have, with utmost respect to the Judges comprising the  Bench  that heard the above cases, found it difficult to follow suit  and  subscribe  to the view stated in Bhasakaran.

Justice Thakur summarized the principles as follows

(i)   An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments  Act,  1881is committed no sooner a cheque drawn by the accused  on  an  account  being maintained by him in a bank for  discharge  of  debt/liability  is  returned unpaid for insufficiency of funds or for the reason that the amount  exceeds the arrangement made with the bank.

(ii)  Cognizance of any such offence is however forbidden under Section  142 of the Act except upon a complaint in writing made by the  payee  or  holder of the cheque in due course within a period of one month from the  date  the cause of action accrues to such payee or holder under clause (c) of  proviso to Section 138.

(iii)  The  cause  of  action   to   file   a   complaint   accrues   to   a complainant/payee/holder of a cheque in due course if

(a)   the dishonoured cheque is  presented  to  the  drawee  bank  within  a period of six months from the date of its issue.

(b) If the complainant has demanded payment of cheque amount  within  thirty days of receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the  dishonour of the cheque and

(c)   If the drawer has failed to pay the cheque amount within fifteen  days of receipt of such notice.

(iv)   The  facts  constituting  cause  of  action  do  not  constitute  the ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the Act.

(v)   The proviso to Section  138  simply  postpones/defers  institution  of criminal proceedings and taking of cognizance by the Court  till  such  time cause  of  action  in  terms  of  clause  (c)  of  proviso  accrues  to  the complainant.

(vi)  Once the cause of action accrues to the complainant, the  jurisdiction of the Court to try the case will be determined by reference  to  the  place where the cheque is dishonoured.

(vii)  The general rule stipulated under Section 177 of  Cr.P.C  applies  to cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.   Prosecution  in such cases can, therefore, be launched against  the  drawer  of  the  cheque only before the Court within whose jurisdiction the  dishonour  takes  place except  in  situations  where  the  offence  of  dishonour  of  the   cheque punishable under Section 138 is committed along with  other  offences  in  a single transaction within the meaning of Section 220(1)  read  with  Section 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is covered  by  the  provisions  of Section 182(1) read with Sections 184 and 220 thereof.