Tuesday, April 2, 2013

Condonation of Delay in case of Appeals


  Section 5 of the Limitation deals with condonation of delay in case of appeal. Since the limitation period for appeals is very short, this section is then introduced to meet the end of justice such that the purpose of justice is not defeated merely because there is “sufficient cause” is present due to which an appeal was not preferred. This section extends the limitation period. The word “”sufficient cause” is an important phrase in this section. Since the section is not a matter of right for the party who pleads the condonation, but it depends on the discretion of the court.The court must be satisfied that the delay is caused due to a genuine reason.
 
It is sufficiency of the cause which counts, and not length of delay - Expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction - As regards delay on the part of State, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible - Expression "sufficient cause" should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay - Matter remitted to High Court to decide the criminal revision on merits - Suggestions made to prevent delay in State litigation - Administration of justice – [STATE (NCT OF DELHI) VS AHMED JAAN. AUGUST 12, 2008]
 
Now the question arises what can be the “sufficient cause” which the court accepts-:
 
1. Illness it is the sufficient cause when it is proved without the reasonable cause that the appellant was not able to file an appeal.
 
2. Imprisonment-The imprisonment of the appellant can be a sufficient cause.
 
3. Ignorance of law can also be a one of the reason but it should be bonafide.
 
4. Mistake of fact-It should be real and unintentional.
 
5. Delay in obtaining copies of judgement can be sufficient cause also this reason is also covered in section 12.
 
6. Poverty, Infancy, Pardah
 
7. Mistake of Counsel-mistake by counsel which is not negligence.
 
But to enjoy the benefit of section 5 There should be no negligence due to inaction of the party is a prerequisite, also length of delay is not a matter of concern but reasonable explanation why the delay has occurred is the subject matter of this section.
 
In the end the court prefer liberal approach in favour of justice and favour only reasonable excuses to condone any delay in filing an appeal .However the court must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the delay was genuine and it must be condoned in favour of justice. Also there should be absence of negligence in order to make the cause reasonable.

Increase in Trademarks Infringement Cases


Under the Trademarks Act, 1999, the Registered Proprietor or the authorized user of a trademark can take recourse to civil or criminal action against the infringer in the appropriate fora. The statistics of trademark infringements is not maintained by the Central Government.
 
The accession (proposed notification of Trademark rules under the Trademark (Amendment) Act, 2010 would enable the Indian companies to register their trademarks in the member-countries of the Protocol through a single applications as well as allow foreign companies to register their trade marks in India, within a specific timeframe i.e. 18 months. At present, there are 86 contracting parties to the Protocol. Under the Trademarks (Amendments) Act, 2010, the Head Office of the Trade Marks Registry (which is at Mumbai) or such branch of the Trade Marks Registry as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette specify, will deal with the international applications.

Saturday, October 6, 2012

Income tax returns out of RTI ambit

                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

          Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 27734          of 2012
                              (@ CC 14781/2012)



Girish Ramchandra Deshpande                  .. Petitioner
                                   Versus
Cen. Information Commr. & Ors.                     .. Respondents



                                  O R D E R

1.    Delay condoned.

2.    We are, in this case, concerned with the question whether the  Central
Information Commissioner (for short 'the CIC') acting  under  the  Right  to
Information Act, 2005 (for  short  'the  RTI  Act')  was  right  in  denying
information regarding the third respondent's personal matters pertaining  to
his  service  career  and  also  denying  the  details  of  his  assets  and
liabilities, movable  and  immovable  properties  on  the  ground  that  the
information sought for was qualified to be personal information  as  defined
in clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act.


3.    The petitioner  herein  had  submitted  an  application  on  27.8.2008
before  the  Regional  Provident  Fund  Commissioner  (Ministry  of  Labour,
Government  of  India)  calling  for  various  details  relating  to   third
respondent, who was employed  as  an  Enforcement  Officer  in  Sub-Regional
Office, Akola, now working in the State of Madhya Pradesh.  As  many  as  15
queries were made to which the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner,  Nagpur
gave the following reply on 15.9.2008:

      "As to Point No.1:     Copy of appointment order of Shri A.B. Lute, is
                            in 3 pages.  You have  sought  the  details  of
                            salary in respect  of  Shri  A.B.  Lute,  which
                            relates to personal information the disclosures
                            of which has  no  relationship  to  any  public
                            activity   or   interest,   it   would    cause
                            unwarranted  invasion   of   the   privacy   of
                            individual  hence  denied  as   per   the   RTI
                            provision under Section 8(1)(j) of the Act.


      As to Point No.2:      Copy of order of granting  Enforcement  Officer
                            Promotion to Shri A.B. Lute, is  in  3  Number.
                            Details  of  salary  to  the  post  along  with
                            statutory and other deductions of Mr.  Lute  is
                            denied to provide as per RTI  provisions  under
                            Section  8(1)(j)  for  the  reasons   mentioned
                            above.


      As to Point NO.3:      All the transfer orders of Shri A.B. Lute,  are
                            in 13 Numbers.  Salary details is  rejected  as
                            per the provision under Section 8(1)(j) for the
                            reason mentioned above.


      As to Point No.4:      The copies of memo, show cause notice,  censure
                            issued to Mr. Lute, are not being  provided  on
                            the ground  that  it  would  cause  unwarranted
                            invasion of the privacy of the  individual  and
                            has no relationship to any public  activity  or
                            interest.   Please  see  RTI  provision   under
                            Section 8(1)(j).


      As to Point No.5:      Copy of EPF (Staff & Conditions) Rules 1962  is
                            in 60 pages.


      As to Point No.6:      Copy of return of  assets  and  liabilities  in
                            respect of Mr. Lute cannot be provided  as  per
                            the provision of RTI Act under Section  8(1)(j)
                            as per the  reason  explained  above  at  point
                            No.1.


      As to Point No.7:      Details of investment and other related details
                            are rejected as per the provision  of  RTI  Act
                            under  Section  8(1)(j)  as  per   the   reason
                            explained above at point No.1.


      As to Point No.8:      Copy of report of  item  wise  and  value  wise
                            details of  gifts  accepted  by  Mr.  Lute,  is
                            rejected as per the provisions of RTI Act under
                            Section 8(1)(j) as  per  the  reason  explained
                            above at point No.1.


      As  to  Point  No.9:       Copy  of  details  of  movable,   immovable
                            properties of Mr. Lute, the request to  provide
                            the same is rejected as per the RTI  Provisions
                            under Section 8(1)(j).


      As to Point  No.10:      Mr.  Lute  is  not  claiming  for  TA/DA  for
                            attending the criminal case  pending  at  JMFC,
                            Akola.


      As to Point No.11:     Copy of Notification is in 2 numbers.


      As to Point No.12:     Copy of certified true  copy  of  charge  sheet
                            issued to Mr. Lute - The matter  pertains  with
                            head Office, Mumbai.  Your application is being
                            forwarded to Head Office, Mumbai as per Section
                            6(3) of the RTI Act, 2005.


      As to  Point  No.13:      Certified  True  copy  of  complete  enquiry
                            proceedings initiated against  Mr.  Lute  -  It
                            would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy  of
                            individuals and  has  no  relationship  to  any
                            public activity or interest.   Please  see  RTI
                            provisions under Section 8(1)(j).


      As to Point No.14:     It would cause unwarranted invasion of  privacy
                            of individuals and has no relationship  to  any
                            public activity or interest,  hence  denied  to
                            provide.


      As to Point No.15:     Certified true copy of second show cause notice
                            -  It  would  cause  unwarranted  invasion   of
                            privacy of individuals and has no  relationship
                            to  any  public  activity  or  interest,  hence
                            denied to provide."




4.    Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner approached the  CIC.   The
CIC passed the order on 18.6.2009, the operative portion of the order  reads
as under:

      "The question for consideration is whether the  aforesaid  information
      sought by the Appellant can be treated as  'personal  information'  as
      defined in clause (j) of Section 8(1) of  the  RTI  Act.   It  may  be
      pertinent to mention that this issue came up before the Full Bench  of
      the Commission in Appeal No.CIC/AT/A/2008/000628  (Milap  Choraria  v.
      Central Board of Direct Taxes) and the Commission  vide  its  decision
      dated 15.6.2009 held that "the Income Tax  return  have  been  rightly
      held to be personal information exempted from disclosure under  clause
      (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act  by  the  CPIO  and  the  Appellate
      Authority, and the appellant herein has not  been  able  to  establish
      that a larger public interest would be served by  disclosure  of  this
      information.  This logic would hold good as far as the  ITRs  of  Shri
      Lute are  concerned.   I  would  like  to  further  observe  that  the
      information which has been denied to the appellant  essentially  falls
      in two parts - (i) relating to the personal matters pertaining to  his
      services career; and (ii) Shri Lute's assets  &  liabilities,  movable
      and immovable properties and  other  financial  aspects.   I  have  no
      hesitation in holding that this information also qualifies to  be  the
      'personal information' as defined in clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the
      RTI Act and the appellant has not been able to convince the Commission
      that disclosure thereof is in larger public interest."




5.    The CIC, after holding so directed the second respondent  to  disclose
the information at paragraphs 1, 2, 3 (only posting  details),  5,  10,  11,
12,13 (only copies of the posting orders) to the appellant within  a  period
of four weeks from the date of the order.  Further, it  was  held  that  the
information sought for with regard to the other queries did not qualify  for
disclosure.

6.    Aggrieved by the said order, the  petitioner  filed  a  writ  petition
No.4221 of 2009 which came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge  and
the court dismissed the same vide order dated  16.2.2010.   The  matter  was
taken up by way of Letters Patent Appeal No.358 of 2011 before the  Division
Bench and the same was dismissed vide order dated 21.12.2011.   Against  the
said order this special leave petition has been filed.

7.    Shri A.P. Wachasunder, learned counsel appearing  for  the  petitioner
submitted that the documents sought  for  vide  Sl.  Nos.1,  2  and  3  were
pertaining to appointment and promotion and Sl.  No.4  and  12  to  15  were
related to disciplinary action and documents at Sl. Nos.6 to 9 pertained  to
assets and liabilities and gifts received by the third  respondent  and  the
disclosure of those details, according to the  learned  counsel,  would  not
cause unwarranted invasion of privacy.

8.    Learned counsel also submitted that the privacy  appended  to  Section
8(1)(j) of the RTI Act widens the scope of documents  warranting  disclosure
and if those provisions are properly interpreted, it could not be said  that
documents  pertaining  to  employment  of  a  person  holding  the  post  of
enforcement officer could be treated as documents having no relationship  to
any public activity or interest.

9.    Learned counsel also pointed out that in view of Section 6(2)  of  the
RTI Act, the applicant making request for  information  is  not  obliged  to
give any reason for the  requisition  and  the  CIC  was  not  justified  in
dismissing his appeal.

10.   This Court in Central Board of  Secondary  Education  and  another  v.
Aditya Bandopadhyay and others (2011) 8  SCC  497  while  dealing  with  the
right of examinees to inspect evaluated answer books in connection with  the
examination conducted by the CBSE Board  had  an  occasion  to  consider  in
detail the aims and object of the RTI Act as well as  the  reasons  for  the
introduction  of  the  exemption  clause  in  the  RTI  Act,  hence,  it  is
unnecessary, for the purpose of this case to  further  examine  the  meaning
and contents of Section 8 as a whole.

11.   We are, however, in this case primarily concerned with the  scope  and
interpretation to clauses (e), (g) and (j) of Section 8(1) of  the  RTI  Act
which are extracted herein below:
      "8. Exemption from disclosure  of  information.-  (1)  Notwithstanding
      anything contained in this Act, there shall be no obligation  to  give
      any citizen,-


      (e) information available to a person in his  fiduciary  relationship,
      unless the competent authority is satisfied  that  the  larger  public
      interest warrants the disclosure  of such information;


      (g) information, the disclosure of which would endanger  the  life  or
      physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or
      assistance  given  in  confidence  for  law  enforcement  or  security
      purposes;


      (j) information which relates to personal information  the  disclosure
      of which has no relationship to any public activity  or  interest,  or
      which  would  cause  unwarranted  invasion  of  the  privacy  of   the
      individual unless the Central Public Information Officer or the  State
      Public Information Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may
      be, is  satisfied  that  the  larger  public  interest  justifies  the
      disclosure of such information."




12.   The petitioner herein sought for  copies  of  all  memos,  show  cause
notices and censure/punishment awarded to  the  third  respondent  from  his
employer and also details viz. movable and  immovable  properties  and  also
the details of his investments, lending and borrowing from Banks  and  other
financial institutions.    Further, he has also sought for  the  details  of
gifts stated to have accepted by the third respondent,  his  family  members
and friends and relatives at the  marriage  of  his  son.   The  information
mostly sought for finds a place in the  income  tax  returns  of  the  third
respondent.  The question that has come up for consideration is whether  the
above-mentioned  information  sought   for   qualifies   to   be   "personal
information" as defined in clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act.

13.   We are in agreement with  the  CIC  and  the  courts  below  that  the
details called for by the petitioner i.e. copies of all memos issued to  the
third respondent, show cause notices and orders of  censure/punishment  etc.
are qualified to be  personal  information  as  defined  in  clause  (j)  of
Section 8(1) of the RTI Act.  The performance of an employee/officer  in  an
organization is primarily a matter between the  employee  and  the  employer
and normally those aspects are governed by  the  service  rules  which  fall
under the expression "personal information", the disclosure of which has  no
relationship to any public activity or public interest.  On the other  hand,
the disclosure of which would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of  that
individual.  Of course, in a given case, if the Central  Public  Information
Officer or the State Public Information Officer of the  Appellate  Authority
is satisfied that the larger public interest  justifies  the  disclosure  of
such information, appropriate orders could  be  passed  but  the  petitioner
cannot claim those details as a matter of right.

14.   The details disclosed by a  person  in  his  income  tax  returns  are
"personal information" which stand exempted  from  disclosure  under  clause
(j) of Section 8(1)  of  the  RTI  Act,  unless  involves  a  larger  public
interest and the Central Public Information  Officer  or  the  State  Public
Information Officer or the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the  larger
public interest justifies the disclosure of such information.

15.   The petitioner in the instant case has not made  a  bona  fide  public
interest in seeking information, the disclosure of  such  information  would
cause unwarranted invasion  of  privacy  of  the  individual  under  Section
8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.

16.   We are, therefore, of the view that the petitioner has  not  succeeded
in establishing that the information sought for is  for  the  larger  public
interest.  That being the fact,  we  are  not  inclined  to  entertain  this
special leave petition.  Hence, the same is dismissed.

Wednesday, August 22, 2012

Supreme Court extends ban on tourism in core areas of tiger reserves

 Extending the ban on tourism activities in the core areas of tiger reserves, the Supreme Court today pulled up the Centre for the depleting population of the wild cats in the country.

A bench of justices A K Patnaik and Swatanter Kumar put some searching questions to the Centre as it made a fresh plea for the review of the apex court's July 24 order banning tourism in the core areas of tiger reserves.

"You are trying to make up. You have done it (guidelines) after due deliberation. We want to know on what basis you want to do it? What is the data available?

"What are you going to do to save tigers? Earlier it was 13,000, now it has come down to 1,200. You are more worried about the commercial activities," the bench told the Centre's counsel Waseem Ahmed Kadiri.

The apex court made the observation after the Centre made a mention of its affidavits filed in the court for permission to review its earlier guidelines for conservation of tiger.

The apex court earlier on July 24 had imposed an interim ban on tourism in core areas of tiger reserves on the basis of same guidelines. The ban extended today would remain in place at least till next hearing on August 29.

"What have you done for the tiger project? What about the core areas you have promised to take steps for? The Union of India has not done anything except filling affidavits. Why did you initially recommend the ban?," the court asked the counsel.

The apex court later while ordering that its interim ban order would continue posted the matter for further hearing to August 29

Monday, July 30, 2012

Limitation Act - Time for Appeal

Law relating to limitation is incorporated in the Limitation Act 1963 which prescribes different periods of limitation for suits, petition or applications. The act applies to all civil proceedings and some special criminal proceedings which can be taken in the court of law unless its application is excluded by any enactment. The Act extends to whole of India except the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The statutes of limitation are based on the principles of public policy which diligence and to prevent oppression.
 
The Law of limitation bars the remedy in a court of law only when the period of limitation has expired, but it does not extinguish the right that it cannot be enforced by judicial process. Thus if a claim is satisfied outside the court of law after the expiry of period of limitation, that is not illegal.
 
The intention of the law of limitation is, not to give right where there is not one, but to interpose a bar after a certain period to a suit to enforce an existing right. The object is to compel litigants to be diligent in seeking remedies in court of law by prohibiting stale claims. It is to help the bona fide claimant and to prevent fraud being practiced by people upon innocent persons by keeping action hanging on them for a long time.
 
Computation of the period of Limitation
 
The Courts in India are bound by the specific provisions of the limitation Act and are not permitted to move outside the ambit of these provisions. The Act prescribed the period of limitation in Articles in schedule to the Act. In the articles of the schedule to the limitation Act. columns 1,2, and 3 must read together to give harmonious meaning and construction.
 
Bar of Limitation
 
Sec 3 of the Act provides that any suit, appeal or application if made beyond the prescribed period of limitation, it is the duty of the court not to proceed with such suits irrespective of the fact whether the plea of limitation has been setup in defence or not. The provision of sec 3 are mandatory. The court can suo  motu take note. The effect of sec 3 not to deprive the court of is jurisdiction. Therefore, decision of a court allowing a suit which had been instituted after the period prescribed is not vitiated for want of jurisdiction.
 
Extension of Time in Certain Cases
 
Doctrine of sufficient cause
 
Sec 5 allows the extension of prescribed period in certain cases on sufficient cause being shown for the delay. This is known as doctrine of “Sufficient cause” for condonation of delay which is embodied in sec 5 of the Limitation Act. 1963. Sec 5 provides that any application other than application under provision of order XXI of the code of civil procedure 1908 may admitted after the period of limitation if the appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal. However it must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party.
 
Person under legal disability
 
Section 6 is an enabling section to enable persons under disability to exercise their legal rights within a certain time. Section 7 supplements section 6,section 8 controls these section, which served as an exception  to sec 6 and 7. The combined effect of section 6 and 8 is that where the prescribed limit expires before the cessation of disability, for instance, before the attainment of majority, the minor will no doubt be entitled fresh period of limitation.
 
Computation of period of limitation:

i)  Section 12 to 24 deals with computation of period limitation. As per section 12 the day to be excluded in computing period is the day from which the period is to be reckoned and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of decree shall be excluded.

ii)  Time which leave to sue or appeal as a pauper is applied for also excluded.

iii)  The time which a suit or application stayed by an injunction and the continuance of the injunction and the time taken for obtaining sanction or consent.

Divorce by mutual consent

i) A separation of one year before filing the case please note that actual physical separation is not required, even if both parties are sleeping in the same bedroom they can be said to be seperated for the purposes of mutual consent, if they are not living together as husband and wife;
 
ii) A flawlessly drafted MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) that settles the terms on which you part away, people don’t understand the importance of this, this is extremely important so as to end the matters with a finality once and for all, there are no loose ends and make sure there is no litigation in future;
 
Once the above is done – you have to get drafted the Divorce petition that encapsulates the contents of your earlier MoU.
 
After Court
 
When you file your divorce by mutual consent petition – it comes up for hearing and your statements are recorded, then the court gives you a period of 6 months (basically to think over your decision) after which,  on recording of final statements divorce decree is passed.
 
Monetary Settlement/Maintenance/Alimony/Child Custody issues.
 
A Mutual Consent petition gives you the flexibility to come to your own terms with respect to the issue. If a full and final settlement is reached – the money can be paid before the court at the time of final hearing.
 
In all this procedure enables couples to part away amicably on a good note, without ruinous litigation, and without much expense.

Sunday, July 29, 2012

Indian Contract Act, Non compete clause


A non-compete clause or a covenant not to compete is a term used in contracts under which the employee agrees to not pursue a similar profession, trade or business in competition against the employer. Apart from the regular employment agreements, such covenants are also at times included in the agreements relating to sale of goodwill of business or professional practice, employment exit and other exclusive dealings and service arrangements.

The Indian Contract Act, 1872, which provides a framework of rules and regulations, governing the formation and performance of a contract in India deals with the legality of such non-compete covenants. It stipulates that an agreement, which restrains anyone from carrying on a lawful profession, trade or business, is void to that extent. Under section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 agreements in restraint of trade are void.


Agreement in restraint of trade is defined as the one in which a party agrees with any other party to restrict his liberty in the present or the future to carry on a specified trade or profession with other persons not parties to the contract without the express permission of the latter party in such a manner as he chooses. Providing for restraint on employment in the employment contracts of the employees in the form of confidentiality requirement or in the form of restraint on employment with competitors has become a part of the corporate culture.

Section 27
Every agreement by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession or trade or business of any kind, is to that extent void.
Exception: One who sells goodwill of a business with a buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business, within specified local limits so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the goodwill from him, carries on a like business therein provided that such limits appear to the Court reasonable, regard being had to the nature of business.

Although the section states that all agreements in restraint of any profession, trade or business are void, the current trend as per various judicial pronouncements leads to the conclusion that reasonable restraint is permitted and does not render the contract void ab initio. Reasonableness of restraint depends upon various factors, and the restraint in order to prevent divulgence of trade secrets or business connections has to be reasonable in the interest of the parties to ensure adequate protection to the covenantee. The above section implies that to be valid an agreement in restraint of trade must be reasonable as between the parties and consistent with the interest of the public.

Therefore two terms need to be defined:
1. What is public policy?
2. What is “reasonable”?

PUBLIC POLICY

The concept of public policy is illusive, varying and uncertain. The term ‘Public Policy ’ is not capable of a precise definition and whatever tends to injustice of operation, restraint of liberty, commerce and natural or legal rights; whatever tends to the obstruction of justice or violation of statutes and whatever is against good morals can be said to be against public policy.

It has been held that the concept of public policy is capable of expansion and modification.[1]

The Supreme Court observed in in Gherulal Pathak v. Mahadeodas Maiya[2]
“Public policy is a vague and unsatisfactory term and calculated to lead to uncertainty and error and when applied to decision of legal rights it is capable of being understood in different senses. It is the province of the judge to expound this law only. They have become a part of recognized law, and we are therefore bound by them. There are several decisions of the courts which lays down a general rule as to what is an agreement opposed to public policy and what is not. These, though provide guidelines as to defining ‘public policy’ cannot be used as a sure shot rule”.

Agreements opposed to public policy:
There are several moral, legal, ethical constraints. Some case laws help to understand what an agreement in restraint of public policy is.
If an agreement is such that it tends to injure public interest or public welfare it is against public policy [3]
Where there is an agreement between the parties that a certain consideration should proceed from the accused person to the complainant in return for the promise of the complainant to discontinue the criminal proceedings is clearly a transaction as opposed to public policy[4]

Agreements Not Opposed to Public Policy:
A contract for manning, running, operating, repairing and maintenance on hire for three vehicles was entered into between parties. The contracts inter alia provided that the employer shall have the right to terminate the contract after expiry of one year without assigning reasons. It was held that such a stipulation was not unconscionable or opposed to public policy[5]

Hence using these guidelines courts can deduce what is public policy as it has not been appropriately defined in any case law.

WHAT IS REASONABLE?

As defined by the dictionary reasonable means – according to reason.
Hence whatever a reasonable man would do, using commonsense and knowledge, under the given circumstances, will account as reasonable. Therefore the test of reasonability depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.

 Where services are performed under an agreement that the remuneration shall be to the discretion of the employer, the question whether the employer has the right to determine whether any remuneration at all shall be paid, so that his decision is a condition precedent to any claim or merely has the right to fix the amount of the remuneration, is a question of construction and intention in each particular case.[6]

Reasonable restrictions can be placed in the following ways:

1. Distance: suitable restrictions can be placed on employee to not practice the same profession within a stipulated distance, the stipulation being reasonable.

2. Time limit: if there is a reasonable time provided in the clause then it will fall under reasonable restrictions.

3. Trade secrets: the employer can put reasonable restrictions on the letting out of trade secrets.

4. Goodwill: There is an exception under section 27 of the Indian Contract Act on the distribution of goodwill.

NON COMPETE CLAUSES UNENFORCEABLE IN INDIA

With the increase in cross-border trade and an enhanced competitive climate in India, confidentiality, non-compete, and non-solicitation agreements are becoming increasingly popular, especially in the IT and technology sectors. An increasing number of outsourcing and IT companies are including confidentiality, non-compete, and non-solicitation clauses in agreements with their employees, with terms ranging from a few months to several years after the employment relationship are terminated. The companies claim that such restrictions are necessary to protect their proprietary rights and their confidential information.

Indian courts have consistently refused to enforce post-termination non-compete clauses in employment contracts, viewing them as "restraint of trade" impermissible under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and as void and against public policy because of their potential to deprive an individual of his or her fundamental right to earn a livelihood.

There are various case laws that will clear out the situation in India:

Supreme Court of India in Percept D' Mark (India) Pvt. Ltd v Zaheer Khan [7] observed that under Section 27 of the Act a restrictive covenant extending beyond the term of the contract is void and not enforceable. The court also noted that the doctrine of "restraint of trade" is not confined to contracts of employment only, but is also applicable to all other contracts with respect to obligations after the contractual relationship is terminated.

In a 2009 decision by the New Delhi High Court in Desiccant Rotors International Pvt Ltd v Bappaditya Sarkar & Anr [8] involved a senior marketing manager at a manufacturer of evaporative cooling components, products and systems. As part of his employment agreement with Desiccant, the manager agreed that for two years following the termination of his employment, he would be bound by a covenant with Desiccant that would require him to keep Desiccant's matters confidential, and that would prevent him from competing with Desiccant and soliciting Desiccant's customers, suppliers and employees. Expressly embodied in the employment agreement was an acknowledgment by the manager that he was dealing with confidential material of Desiccant, including: know-how, technology trade secrets, methods and processes, market sales, and lists of customers. After a few years of employment, the manager resigned and-notwithstanding the terms of his old employment agreement-within three months of his resignation joined a direct competitor of Desiccant as country manager in charge of marketing and started contacting customers and suppliers of Desiccant. In injunctive proceedings against the manager by Desiccant, the High Court reiterated the principles embodied in Section 27 of the Act and the individual's fundamental right to earn a living by practicing any trade or profession of his or her choice. Brushing aside any argument by Desiccant that the restrictive covenants were primarily designed to protect its confidential and proprietary information, the High Court ruled that in the clash between the attempt of employers to protect themselves from competition and the right of employees to seek employment wherever they choose, the right of livelihood of employees must prevail. However the High Court did allow an injunction against the manager prohibiting him from soliciting Desiccant's customers and suppliers to stand in effect.

Similarly, in a 2007 decision in V.F.S. Global Services Ltd. v. Mr. Suprit Roy [9]

The Bombay High Court held that a fully paid three-month "garden leave" agreement with a senior manager did not renew the employment contract and constituted a "restraint of trade" unenforceable by V.F.S. However, relief for breach of non-solicitation obligations was denied on the basis of vagueness of the relief claimed.

In Superintendence Company of India vs Krishan Murgai [10]

The Supreme Court held that a contract, which had for its object a restraint of trade, was prima facie void. The company, with its head office at Kolkata and branch office at New Delhi, carried on business as valuers and surveyors. It had established a reputation and goodwill in its business by developing its own techniques for quality testing and control and possessed trade secrets in the form of these techniques and clientele. Mr Murgai was employed as branch manager of the New Delhi office. One of clauses of the terms and conditions of employment placed him under a post-service restraint that he would neither serve any other competitive firm nor carry on business on his own in similar line for two years at the place of his last posting; and the restriction would come into operation after he left the company. When he was terminated from service, the employee started a business on similar lines. When the matter came for appeal, the Supreme Court held that under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a service covenant extended beyond the termination of the service was void.

In Star India Pvt Ltd. V. Laxmiraj Seetharam Nayak [11],

The Bombay High Court held that an employer has right to terminate the contract of employment on the ground of misconduct; hence, it cannot be said that the employee had absolutely no right to resign from the employment on account of better prospects or other personal reasons. It was observed by the court that merely because for some time the employer might face some inconvenience, the employee concerned cannot be forced to come back for the pleasure of the employer or to satisfy the ego of the higher-ups of the contemplated competition in the market.
In Sandhya Organic Chemicals P.Ltd v. United Phosphorous [12],

The Gujarat High Court held that a service covenant extended beyond the termination of the service is void. It was held that an employee could not be restrained for all times to come to use his knowledge and experience which he gained during the course of employment either with the employer or with any other employer. It was also held that the principles laid down by the English Courts on common law and equity will not be applicable in view of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act.

In Lalbhai Dalpatbhai and co. v. Chittaranjan Chandulal Pandya[13],

The Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court consolidated all the fundamental principles concerning the negative stipulation in the contract of service during the service period and after the service period. The Bench dealt with the problem with utmost clarity and great vision. In fact, this should be a guiding judgment on the point. While considering the freedom of contract and the freedom of occupation, they laid down the fundamental principle that the freedom of contract must yield to the freedom of occupation in public interest.” The Bench said that it must be seen whether the enforcement of the negative stipulation is “reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the employer. If it is not going to benefit the employer in any legitimate manner, the court would not injunct the employee from exercising his skill, training and knowledge merely because the employee has agreed to it.”

In M/S Gujarat Pottling Co.Ltd. & Ors vs The Coca Cola Co. & Ors on 4 August, 1995[14]

The Supreme Court exhaustively reviewed the law relating to the validity of the contracts containing a negative covenant in commercial agreements. In paragraph No. 14 of the agreement entered into in the year 1993 between the parties in Gujrat Bottling Company's case provided that the Bottler would not manufacture, bottle, sale deed or otherwise be connected with the products, beverages of any other brands or trademarks/trade names during the subsistence of the agreement including the period of one year notice of termination. The 1993 agreement between the parties in that case was construed by the Supreme Court to be an agreement of a grant of franchiser by Coca Cola as a franchiser to Gujarat Botting Co. (GBC) as a franchisee whereby the GBC had been permitted to manufacture, bottle and sell beverages covered by the trade marks in the area covered by the agreement. The Supreme Court was required to consider whether the negative stipulation contained in paragraph No. 14 of the 1993 agreement being in restraint of trade was void under provisions of section 27 of the Contract Act. The Supreme Court noted that in England in earlier times, all contracts in restraint of relaxed and it became a rule that a partial restraint might be good if reasonable although a general restraint was void. The distinction between the general and partial restraint was subsequently repudiated and the rule, in England, now is that restraints whether general of partial may be good if they are reasonable and any restraint of freedom of contract must be shown to be reasonable to be valid. The principle that agreement in restraint of trade is void is a common law principle applicable in England while it has a statutory recognition under section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. While construing the provisions of section 27 of the Contract Act, the High Courts in India have held that neither the test of reasonableness nor the principle that the restraint being partial or reasonable are applicable to a case governed by section 27 of the Contract Act, unless it falls within the exception. The Law Commission in its 13th report has recommended that the provision (section 27 of the Contract Act) should be suitably amended to allow such restrictions and all contracts in restraint of trade, general or partial as were reasonable in the interest of the parties as well as public. No action is, however, been taken by the Parliament on the said recommendations (See paragraph No. 23).

However the court has upheld the non compete principle where is it reasonable:

In the case The Supreme Court of India in Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. The Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd [15]. observed that restraints or negative covenants in the appointment or contract may be valid if they are reasonable. A restraint upon freedom of contract must be shown to be reasonably necessary for the purpose of freedom of trade. The court held that a person may be restrained from carrying on his trade by reason of an agreement voluntarily entered into by him with that object. In such a case the general principle of freedom of trade must be applied with due regard to the principle that public policy requires the utmost freedom to the competent parties to enter into a contract and that it is public policy to allow a trader to dispose of his business and to afford to an employer an unrestricted choice of able assistance and the opportunity to instruct them in his trade and its secrets without fear of their becoming his competitors. Where an agreement is challenged on the ground of its being in restraint of trade, the onus is upon the party supporting the contract to show that the restraint is reasonably necessary to protect his interests. Once, this onus is discharged by him, the onus of showing that the restrain is nevertheless injurious to the public is upon the party attacking the contract.

Hence the non-compete covenants used in agreements can be categorized into in term and post term covenants. In an employment contract, the basic interests of the employer which are required to be protected include trade secrets and business connections and other such confidential information. In case of restraints in contracts of employment the nature of business and employment is relevant in assessing the reasonableness of restraints. An employee owes a duty to the employer to not disclose to others or use to his own advantage the trade secrets or confidential information which he had access to during the course of employment and he could be restrained from or sued for divulging or utilizing any such information in his new employment. But once again, he cannot be prevented from taking up the employment. Also, the employer cannot prevent the use of employee’s knowledge, skill or experience even if the same is acquired during the course of employment. Restrictive covenants are different in cases where the restriction is to apply during the period after termination of the contract than in those cases where it is to operate during the period of the contract.

Negative covenants operative during the period of contract of employment when the employee is bound to serve the employer exclusively are generally not regarded as restraint of trade and do not fall under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act,1872. A negative covenant, one that the employee would not engage himself in a trade or business or would not get employment under any other employer for whom he/she would perform similar or substantially similar duties, is not a restraint of trade unless the contract is unconscionable or excessively harsh or unreasonable or one sided

CONCLUSION

It is well established by the various case laws decided in the courts of India that ‘non compete’ clauses that extend after the termination of employment are not enforceable in India. It is stated clearly in section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 that agreements in restraint of trade are void. In the garb of confidentiality, an employer cannot be allowed to perpetuate forced employment, as it is hit by Section 27.

Even though these clauses are valid in foreign countries, the laws and judicial interpretations of other countries will hardly have any effect on Indian courts if the statutory laws of this country are unambiguous. Post term restrictive covenants have been held invalid through various judicial pronouncements. An employer is not entitled to protect himself against competition on the part of an employee after the employment has ceased. However, a purchaser of a business is entitled to protect himself against competition per se on the part of the vendor and it has been upheld that a employer has no legitimate interest in preventing an employee after he/she leaves his service from entering the service of a competitor merely on the grounds that the employee has started working with a competitor, unless the same leads to misuse or an unauthorized disclosure of confidential information, which has been provided to the employee during his course of employment

Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees the live to livelihood and since it is a fundamental right it is held to be inviolable. This makes the enforcing of non compete clauses in India even more of a difficult task.

[1]P.Rathinam v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1844 (1994) 3 SCC 394
[2]AIR 1959 SC 781: 1959 Supp(2)SCR 406
[3]RattanChand Hira Chand v. Aksar Nawaz Jung , (1991) 3 SCC 67
[4]Ouseph Poulo v. Catholic Union Bank ltd AIR 1965 SC 166: (1964) 7 SCR 745
[5]Oil and Natural Gas Corp. Ltd. V. Streamline Shipping Co., AIR 2002 Bom 420 (DB)
[6]S.Ranjan v. Indian Union AIR 1966 Mad 235: 78 Mad LW 636 (DB)
[7]AIR 2006 SC 3426
[8]I.A. No.5455/2008, I.A. No.5454/2008 & I.A. No.5453/2008 in CS(OS) No.337/2008
[9]2008(2)Bom CR 446, 2007(2) CTLJ 423 Bom
[10]1980 AIR 1717, 1980 SCR(3)1278
[11]2003(3) Bom CR 563, 2003(3)MhLj 726
[12]AIR 1997 Guj 177
[13]AIR 1966 Guj 189, (1966) GLR 493
[14]1995 AIR 2372, 1995 SCC (5) 545
[15]1967 AIR 1098, 1967 SCR (2)378

SC notice to Centre on bringing tribunals under one ministry

Litany of tribunals set up under diverse ministries to deal with a slew of issues — ranging from environment to income tax — has resulted in lack of uniformity in their functioning, so much so that members appointed to decide cases were not qualified to practice in them.
A Supreme Court bench of Justices A K Patnaik and Madan Lokur issued notice to the Centre — on the basis of a PIL filed by the Madras Bar Association — that gave a direction to the Union government to bring all tribunals under the administrative aegis of the ministry of law and justice.
The PIL filed through advocate Nikhil Nayyar said Competition Commission of India (CCI) and its Appellate tribunal along with Company Law Board came under the ministry of corporate affairs, while Copyright Board functioned under the HRD ministry.
"Intellectual Property Appellate Board was under the ministry of industry and commerce, while Customs, Excise and Service Appellate Tribunal, Debt Recovery Tribunal and its Appellate Tribunal, and Securities Appellate Tribunal were set up under the aegis of the ministry of finance," it said.
Since the tribunals were not set up under one administrative control, there had been great diversity in the functioning of these grievance redressal forums, it said.
"First, the qualification of members (of these tribunals and boards) is not uniform. In many tribunals, 'administrative' or 'technical' members do not even require a law degree. This has resulted in a curious situation where 95% of the 'technical' members will not be allowed to practice before the tribunal, but will be able to sit on its bench," senior advocate Arvind Datar said arguing for the petitioner.
The retirement age of the members were also not uniform, it said and complained that the administrative ministries have adopted a step-motherly treatment to these tribunals as far as providing infrastructure and staff was concerned.
Besides, the government had never carried out judicial impact assessment while enacting a new statute resulting in defeating the purpose of creating tribunals, which was to reduce pendency.
The apex court had recently taken exception to the manner in which government had treated the National Green Tribunal (NGT), which was woefully short of office space, staff and residential accommodations. Peeved over lack of basic amenities, two judicial members of NGT resigned from their posts.
The PIL said that government had paid scant regard to two judgements of the apex court - the 2010 judgement in R Gandhi case and 1997 judgement in L Chandra Kumar case - that mandated all tribunals be brought under the aegis of the ministry of law and justice.

Mines and mineral are wealth of a nation: SC

The Supreme Court upheld the Jharkhand government’s decision to cancel its recommendation to the Centre to grant mining lease in the state to six private firms and said that Mines and minerals are part of the nation’s wealth.
A bench of justices R M Lodha and H L Gokhale gave the ruling rejecting the private firms’ plea that the state’s act of withdrawing its recommendation to the Centre after making the same was illegal.
“Mines and minerals are a part of the wealth of a nation. They constitute the material resources of the community. Article 39(b) of the Directive Principles mandates that the state shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good”.”We, however, do not find any error in the letter of withdrawal dated September 13, 2005, issued by the state of Jharkhand and the letter of rejection dated March 6, 2006, issued by the Union of India for the reasons stated therein.
“In our view, the state of Jharkhand was fully justified in declining the grant of  mines and minerals lease to the private sector operators and in reserving the areas for the public sector undertakings on the basis of notifications of 1962, 1969 and 2006,” the bench said in a judgement.
The apex court gave the ruling while dismissing a batch of appeal by Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd and various other firms challenging denial of mining lease to them in the state.

SC disposes 1986 land acquisition deed

The Supreme court has quashed the acquisition of land of two industrial units in Dehradun by the Uttar Pradesh government in 1986 on grounds of urgency.
 A bench of justices G S Singhvi and F M Ibrahim Kalifulla annulled the acquisition, saying the state government has failed to produce any material to show that invoking of the urgency clause of the Land Acquisition Act for acquiring the land was bonafide.The bench set aside an order of the Allahabad High Court, which had upheld the acquisition.
“In our opinion the acquisition of the appellants’ land is liable to be quashed because the respondents have not produced any material to show that the state government had formed a bonafide opinion on the issue of invoking the provisions contained in section 17 of the Act”. ”In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the acquisition of the appellants’ land is quashed,” the bench said.
 The apex court’s order came on the plea of Garg Woollen Pvt Ltd and Everest Cylinders Pvt Ltd, against the September 1997 order of the high court which had dismissed their petition seeking quashing of the acquisition of their land.
 Advocate Anil Karnwal, appearing for the companies, had contended before the apex court that there was no urgent need to acquire the land and it was done without giving them an opportunity to voice their objections.
 The Uttar Pradesh government had issued a notification in May, 1985 for it under the Land Acquisition Act to acquire over 250 acres of land in Dehradun for the purpose of developing it into an industrial area.
 The land was acquired on the basis of an order passed by the Special Land Acquisition Collector in November, 1986.
 The appellants had claimed to have purchased the land in 1984, where they had set up their industrial units by 1985 after availing huge loans.
 The apex court allowed their appeal after drawing similarities between the appellants’ case and its recent order quashing the acquisition of farmers’ land in Gautam Budh Nagar area by the Uttar Pradesh government.