The Department of Justice in
the Ministry of Law and Justice issued a terse notification on December 19
saying that by exercising the powers conferred by clause (2) of Article
124 of the constitution of India, the president had appointed Justice
Jagdish Singh Khehar, a Supreme Court judge, as the 44th Chief Justice of India
(CJI), with effect from January 4, 2017.
The notification, albeit
routine, issued ahead of the swearing-in of the new CJI is significant because
of what it fails to reveal. Strange as it may seem, clause (2) of Article 124
of the constitution does not confer any such power on the president to appoint
the CJI.
The relevant part of clause
(2) of Article 124 reads:
“Every judge of the Supreme
Court shall be appointed by the president by warrant under his hand and seal
after consultation with such of the judges of the Supreme Court and of the high
courts in the states as the president may deem necessary for the purpose and
shall hold office until he attains the age of 65 years. Provided that in the
case of appointment of a judge other than the chief justice, the Chief Justice
of India shall always be consulted.”
No doubt, a CJI is also a
judge of the Supreme Court and, therefore, it may be suggested that the power
to appoint a CJI can be inferred from this provision. Justice Khehar, however,
has already been appointed as a Supreme Court judge once and continues to
be one till date.
Therefore, without
a clarificatory notification, the use of this provision would mean
the appointment of the same person twice.
The absurdity of the literal
reading of this provision apart, the lack of clarity in clause (2) of Article
124 with regards to the appointment of the CJI might suggest that the framers
of the constitution perhaps envisaged the appointment of a person to the
post other than the judge of the Supreme Court. Or at the very least, the
framers did not envisage the consultation of the president with the judges of
the Supreme Court – or the CJI – with regard to the appointment of the
incumbent CJI’s successor.
The supersession issue
By appointing Justice Khehar
– the senior-most judge in the Supreme Court after outgoing CJI Justice T.S.
Thakur – as the next CJI, the president has put to rest the speculations that
have been doing the rounds for weeks.
The news must come as a
relief to those who could not rule out supersession in the judiciary
by the present government, as well as to those who believed that the present government
would hesitate to take an unwise step like the supersession of the CJI,
ignoring the convention of elevating the senior-most judge in the Supreme Court
as the CJI.
The senior most puisne of
the Supreme Court has always been appointed as the CJI except on two occasions.
The convention was breached
when Justice A.N. Ray was appointed as the CJI on April 25, 1973, by
superseding three senior-most judges. The supersession was made on the day
following the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Kesavananda Bharati case.
The second supersession took
place during the Emergency when Justice M.H. Beg was appointed as the CJI on
January 29, 1977, by superseding Justice H.R. Khanna.
During the hearing of the
National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) case last year, the government
counsel defending the NJAC assured the Supreme Court’s constitution bench that
these two instances of breaching the convention should be considered as
aberrations.
The bench also took note of
the fact that the first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru wanted to supersede
Justice Patanjali Sastri, who was the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court,
when the first CJI, Harilal Kania, died in office on November 6, 1951.
The bench was told – on the
basis of reliable records – that all the six judges of the Supreme Court
threatened to resign if Sastri was superseded. Sastri only had a few months
left until his retirement and the government acceded to the so-called
non-existent convention at the time.
The petitioners in the NJAC
case, who doubted the government’s bonafides, pointed to the amendment of the
constitution inserting the new Article 124(C), which said that the
parliament may – by law – regulate the procedure for the appointment of CJI and
other judges of the Supreme Court, and the chief justices and other judges of
high courts.
The petitioners were aghast
that the new provision equated the appointment of the CJI with that of the
other judges of the apex court and chief justices and other judges of high
courts without taking note of the convention of seniority guiding the
appointment of the CJI, which was cast in stone all these years.
The petitioners were also
concerned about the vagueness of the term ‘fitness’, used in Section 5 of the NJAC
Act, while referring to the fitness of the senior-most judge of the Supreme
Court, to be determined by parliament, for the purpose of his elevation as the
CJI.
While Attorney General Mukul
Rohatgi clarified to the bench that fitness meant physical and mental fitness
alone, doubts remained whether the parliament could define “fitness” in a
manner subserving the interests of the executive.
The petitioners’ concerns
prevailed over the bench, which struck down both the NJAC Act and the
Constitution 99th Amendment Act 2014, on grounds that if the parliament has the
authority to regulate the procedure for the appointment of judges – including
the CJI – by framing laws, it would mean legislative control, which would breach
the “independence of the judiciary.”
The convention of appointing
the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court as the CJI, following the retirement
of the outgoing CJI, was given the stamp of approval in the Second Judges
Case in 1993.
In that case, a nine-judge
bench had held that “there is no reason to depart from the existing convention
and, therefore, any further norm for the working of Article 124(2) in the
appointment of Chief Justice of India is unnecessary.”
The appointment of the CJI,
by its very nature, was considered distinct from the appointment of other
judges of the apex court and the high courts.
The convention has its own
justification – there is no provision for consultation in the constitution
between the CJI and the president for the appointment of the CJI, unlike in the
case of the appointment of other judges and it is for that reason that a
healthy convention has developed of appointing the senior-most judge of the
court as the CJI.
This convention, the Supreme
Court was told in the Second Judges Case, is in keeping with the concept
of independence of the judiciary as it excludes the possibility of
executive interference in the matter. The Supreme Court’s nine-judge bench
accepted this contention and ruled accordingly. No wonder then that in the NJAC
case, another five-judge bench of the Supreme Court found this convention
inviolable.
Seniority convention has no
roots
Abhinav Chandrachud, a scholar
and lawyer, however, found little evidence for this convention prior to the
establishment of the Supreme Court, specifically in the high courts of Bombay,
Calcutta, Madras, Allahabad, Patna, or in the Federal Court of India (FCI).
According to him, the
seniority norm for the appointment of the chief justices of these high courts
and in the FCI did not prevail. He observed that when viewed as a whole, the
seniority convention in the high courts of India was an exception rather than a
rule.
He adds that in the1950s, the
appointment of the CJIs on the norms of seniority was an aberration, today,
however, it is perhaps indispensable in order to safeguard the independence of
the judiciary.
Chandrachud cites a few
instances of non-judges becoming chief justices in high courts – Basil
Scott was an advocate general and he directly became the chief justice of the
Bombay high court, while P.V. Rajamannar was made the chief justice of the
Madras high court by superseding four judges. William Patrick Spens was
appointed as a chief justice of the federal court – a post vacated by his
predecessor, Maurice Gwyer – even though he was not a federal court or a high
court judge.
India’s first attorney
general, M.C. Setalvad, was asked by the then home minister, K.N. Katju,
whether he was interested in taking Kania’s place as the CJI – referring to a
custom prevalent in England where the attorney general replaces the lord chief
justice. Setalvad reminded the home minister that he had already surpassed the
retirement age. Setalvad apparently suggested to the home minister that M.C.
Chagla, the then chief justice of the Bombay high court, be considered for the
post.
There is evidence suggesting
that the framers of the Indian constitution contemplated someone other than the
Supreme Court judge to become the CJI in order to ensure that the incumbent has
a longer term in office than what most CJIs – elevated on the basis of
seniority – can hope to have.
It is too late in the day to
speculate what could have been the consequence had the six judges of the
Supreme Court not threatened to quit in the face of Nehru’s threat to supersede
Sastri in 1951. Since then, seniority as the only norm for the appointment of
the CJI has become synonymous with the independence of the judiciary.
The rapid succession of the
CJIs and the experience of outgoing CJI Thakur – who had just about a year in
office as the chief justice before his retirement and was therefore at the
receiving end of the government’s indifference to the collegium’s
recommendations for filling vacancies of judges in high courts – should tell us
that in the absence of fixed minimum tenures, no chief justice can hope to
reform the judiciary and thereby ensure its independence from the executive on
aspects other than the appointment of the CJIs.
The next CJI, Khehar, who
assumes office on January 4, 2017, will retire on August 27, 2017, with a
summer vacation lasting for one and a half months.
Seniority is not the ideal
norm to determine the appointment of the CJI, but there appears to be no alternative
at present with the government’s lack of respect for institutions hitting an
all-time low.
https://thewire.in/88687/seniority-norm-cji-appointment-thakur-khehar/