In Master Anant Narayan Rai v. Siddharth Rai [33], the Court observed that the general proposition that no suit can be thrown out for non-joinder of parties as enshrined in the proviso to Order I Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’) would not apply when there is non-joinder of essential and necessary parties. The Court further observed that even though procedural defects and irregularities should normally not be permitted to defeat substantive rights, however in a case where a party had, despite objections from the other side, persisted in not curing the said defect, the harsh consequence of rejection of the suit must necessarily flow.
In Economics Transport Organisation Limited v. Mohan Investments & Properties Private Limited [34], the Court held that a suit seeking an injunction against a defendant from interfering with possession of the plaintiff cannot seek to interject the enforcement of an ejectment decree obtained by the defendant against the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, and the correct remedy in this regard for the plaintiff would be to approach the executing court under Order XXI Rules 98 to 105 of the CPC.
In Natasha Kohli v. Mon Mohon Kohli [35], the Court reiterated that if with the passage of time, it is discovered that the original cause of action on the basis of which a litigation was initiated had ceased to exist, then the Court would not permit the said litigation to continue any further.
In Aruna Oswal v. Gen Y Commodities Private Limited [36], while reiterating the principle of “debtor must seek the creditor”, the Court held that in a suit for recovery of money based on an acknowledged liability, the court within whose jurisdiction the plaintiff is residing would have territorial jurisdiction.
In Kapil Tanwar v. Usha Dutt [37], the Court reiterated that when the purport of an averment in a written statement can be explained and if the said explanation falls short of an admission, then Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC would not come into operation and no judgment on admission could be passed.
In Mrs. Pravin Chatterjee v. Mr. Lakshman Das Bhatia [38], the Court observed that merely because a subsequent suit has been filed challenging a conveyance deed executed by the DDA in favour of the person claiming to be the owner, the said fact could not be taken as a defence in the suit which had been filed seeking possession of the premises on account of termination of lease at an earlier point in time.
In Archana Rawal v. Vijay Kataria [39], the Court while relying on Order XLI Rule 7 of the CPC, observed that a statutory appeal under the CPC could not be decided on merits in the absence of the appellant and it was only open to the concerned court to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution.
In India Affordable Housing Solutions, (IAHS) v. Konark Infra Developers Private Limited [40], the Court held that once an order granting leave to defend subject to deposit of a certain amount had attained finality, and pursuant to the non-deposit, a final decree had followed against the defendant and challenge to which decree was also unsuccessful, then a review petition against the original order granting leave to defend would not be maintainable at that stage.
In Neha Dutta v. Capitol Art House Private Limited [41], the Court observed that a plaint cannot be rejected in exercise of jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC on the solitary ground that the validity of the document upon which the suit was premised was also subject matter of certain other proceedings between the parties.
In Ajay Kumar v. Om Prakash [42], the Court held that when a suit filed by a party was seemingly hit by the principles of res-judicata and issue estoppel, then the necessary corollary would be that the accompanying application for interim relief under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 would suffer rejection on account of lack of a prima-facie case.
In Delhi Development Authority v. Anup Kumar [43], the Court reiterated the different considerations which weighed with the Court while examining an application for condonation of delay in filing the written statement in a commercial suit as distinct from an ordinary suit, and further observed that in the case of the latter a more lenient approach could be adopted.
In North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Dhingra Construction Company [44], the Court issued directions to the district courts to specifically indicate the timeline for filing a written statement while issuing the summons depending on whether the suit in question was a commercial suit or an ordinary suit, and in the case of the former to clearly indicate that the outer limit for filing of a written statement is 120 days.
In Navshakti Educational Society v. Laxman Public School [45], the Court observed that when the documents sought to be exhibited are a record of the judicial proceedings conducted before the High Court and there is no cavil as to the authenticity of the said record, then in the said situation even non-certified copies of the said documents could be permitted to be exhibited.
In Brij Prakash Gupta v. Ashwini Kumar [46], after a detailed examination of the legal position in relation to filing of an examination-in-chief by way of an affidavit and the contents of such an affidavit, the Court deprecated the practice of en-masse mechanical reproduction of the contents of the plaint in the affidavit in lieu of the examination-in-chief, and remarked that the affidavit should only contain facts which are to the personal knowledge of the party concerned. The Court further observed that while it is correct that the contents of the affidavit cannot travel beyond the pleadings, when any such objection is taken the same should be recorded and decided at the stage of final adjudication of the suit and, subject to the same, the cross-examination of the witness should proceed in the meantime. The Court held that deletion of portions from the affidavit of evidence should only be ordered at a preliminary stage when it was ex-facie evident that the relevant averments were totally irrelevant or beyond the pleadings.
In Embassy Restaurant v. Atma Ram Builders Private Limited [47], the Court observed that when there was a specific pleading in a suit that there was an oral agreement between the parties that the house tax would be a part of the rent, and after which inclusion the property would not be covered under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, then the said aspect would require a detailed trial and the suit could not be rejected upon an application being filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
In Arun Kumar Jain v. Bhagwant Singh Pabla [48], the Court held that inasmuch as a mere finding by a Court during a certain stage of the proceeding cannot be challenged unless and until a consequential decree follows, and therefore the said finding which is incapable of being challenged or appealed against cannot operate as res-judicata. While reiterating that a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC could only be passed if there was a categorical or unconditional admission, the Court in Hunny Sharma v. Ved Prakash Sharma [49], cautioned against adopting a ‘shortcut’ procedure when faced with long pendency of suits inasmuch as the same would adversely affect the rights of the parties.
In a similar vein, in Vir Singh v. Chandra Lata [50], the Court reiterated that an admission within the meaning of Order 12 Rule 6 of the CPC must be unequivocal in nature and a vague or stray averment in a pleading would not be sufficient.
In Kishori Lal v. Akhtar Alam [51], the Court observed that an objector in an execution proceeding could not be permitted to take materially improved and additional averments at the appellate stage as compared to the objections raised before the executing court.
In Ashok Kumar Oberoi v. Raj Kumar Kapoor [52], the Court allowed an application under Order XII Rule 6 inasmuch as it found that there were clear admissions in the earlier proceedings between the same parties and that the averments in the instant suit were mechanically denied by the defendant without any real engagement.
In Rajeev Sethi v. Sidharth Gupta [53], the Court rejected an application for leave to defend in a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the CPC inasmuch as it found that there where various acknowledgements of the debt by the defendant including undertakings on stamp paper, a formal memorandum of undertaking, various cheques as also promissory notes. The Court refused to countenance the plea of the defendant that the aforesaid overwhelming number of acknowledgements were obtained under a misconception and by utilising undue influence.
In East India Auto Manufacturing Company Private Limited v. Ishwar Singh [54], the Court observed that an application for impleadment was required to be allowed when the party concerned did seem to have a connection with the transaction which was subject matter of the suit, and at that stage a detailed consideration of the evidence was not required to be undertaken.
In Charanjeet Singh v. Raj Kumar [55], the Court held that mere lack of clarity in the drafting of the prayer in a suit cannot disentitle the Plaintiff from the reliefs sought when the relevant narration in the plaint in this regard was otherwise quite clear.
In Sanjiv Tiwari v. Deepak Poptani [56], the Court held that a counter-claim could not be permitted to be filed after framing of issues in a suit and the same could be permitted only in exceptional cases wherein it could be demonstrated that the recording of evidence pursuant to framing of issues had not commenced.
In Kapil Kumar v. M/s M&A Designs [57], the Court observed that it was not permissible to direct the director of a company to file an affidavit of personal assets in the course of execution of a decree against the company, without first arriving at a finding as to whether there was sufficient ground for lifting the corporate veil.
In Kuldeep Gupta v. Mahendar Kumar [58], the Court observed that the lawyers abstaining from attending courts on whatsoever grounds cannot be permitted to have debilitating consequences for the litigants, and the courts hold a duty to safeguard the interests of the latter in the case of a strike called by lawyers.
In Kusum Lata Jain v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation [59], the Court held that serious allegations of forgery cannot be made in a reckless manner, and without any basis or foundation.
In Rev. Dinesh Das v. Baptist Church Trust Association [60], the Court held that inasmuch as an application seeking stay of a pending suit under Section 10 of the CPC goes to the very root of the matter, the Court is required to necessarily consider the said issue at the outset without proceeding further with the matter.
https://www.barandbench.com/columns/the-delhi-high-court-in-review-february-2020-part-i
